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Willson I. Hurt
1903 - 1963

For nearly twenty years, the students of the University of Denver College of Law had the privilege of studying under Professor
Willson Hurt. His classes in Agency, Business Associations, Creditors' Rights, Negotiable Instruments and Torts were greatly enriched as he shared with us the knowledge gained in his years of
practice. His rich southern accent, which earned him the title "The
Colonel," lent dignity to his presentation, but it was his great
humor that inspired friendship. He was much more than an instructor; he was an interested participant in student activities, academic
and social. We shall miss his friendly greeting in the halls, his many
anecdotes in the classroom and his annual appearance at Derby Day
replete in his old south costume.
This is "The Colonel" that we shall remember. We respectfully
dedicate this issue of the Denver Law Center Journal to the memory of Professor Willson Hurt.
-Board of Student Editors
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
'CIVIL PROCEDURE AND APPEALS
By

ROBERT

B.

YEGGE*

There were no changes of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in 1962 except by judicial interpretation. This stability in the
rules in 1962 portended possible changes in the rules in 1963. By
order of the Supreme Court of the United States on January 21,
1963, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were changed in many
respects. Predictably, the Colorado Supreme Court may consider
revising the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to conform to the
revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1963.
On numerous occasions, the Colorado Supreme Court was asked
to interpret the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in 1962. It heard
new questions and interpreted and re-examined its findings of past
years. As one might expect, problems of civil procedure tend to find
their way into almost every case before the supreme court. Problems involving the rules of procedure were found in 57 of the approximately 242 cases decided by the court.
Since the rules have meaning only in their use, not the order in
which they are organized, the following attempt to classify the rule
interpretations of 1962, according to use, is presented.
I. THE COMPLAINT
Rule 2 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure states: "There
shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' " The action
shall be commenced by filing of a complaint or by service of a summons.' The complaint shall contain " a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."'2 The court
had an opportunity to give meaning to these rules, which we so
often remember but so infrequently use.
In Bernstein v. Dun & Bradstreet,Inc.,3 the supreme court considered dismissal of a libel complaint. It said: "Colorado's Rules of
Civil Procedure are designed to dispense with ritualistic, common'4
law, forms-of-action pleadings.
After reviewing the libel complaint and finding a libel per quod,
rather than a libel per se, the court determined that special damages needed to be pleaded. The court sustained the trial court's dismissal of the libel complaint for failure to properly supply the essential allegations of special damages, after opportunity had been
afforded to do so, stating:
In view of our liberal policy under these rules of dispensing with the overly technical aspects of common-law
pleading, the trial court had the discretion to allow the
plaintiff the opportunity of supplying the essential allegation of special damages by a More Definite Statement ....
Partner, Yegge, Hall and Shulenburg, Denver;
of Denver College of Law:
1 Colo. R. Civ. P. 3(a).
2 Colo. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
3 368 P.2d 780 (Colo. 1962).
4 Id. at 782.
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The trial court merely afforded plaintiff an additional opportunity of remedying what it considered to be a fatal
defect in his complaint."
Moreover, the supreme court again recognized the liberal rules
of pleading but insisted that pleadings must continue to insist upon
the essential elements of the substantive law. Liberal rules to the
contrary notwithstanding, a pleader must still assert the elements
of the claim or his complaint will be dismissed. The complaint must
state a claim.
As already noted, one manner of commencing a civil action is
filing a complaint with the court. 6 In Martin v. District Court,7 two
complaints were filed on the same subject matter. One party contended that she "commenced" an action in the Denver District
Court by service of summons and complaint on her opponent. However, her complaint was not filed until some days later. The adverse
party filed a complaint in the District Court of Adams County prior
to the filing of the complaint in the Denver District Court suit.
Propriety of service of process out of the Denver court's suit was
challenged. Service of process in Denver having been found valid,
the Denver suit was "commenced," according to the rules, before
the Adams County suit was commenced. This being true, the court
found that the Denver District Court had exclusive jurisdiction
over the controversy and ordered suspension of any further action
in the Adams County District Court.' The alternative of service of
process being prior in time to the filing of the complaint in the
court, the "commencement" provisions of Rule 3 (a) applied and the
concurrent jurisdictions of two courts, each having received complaints, was resolved.
The alternative of "commencement of an action" by service of
summons is attended with the requirement that "a complaint must
be filed within ten days after the summons is served, or, the action
may be dismissed without prejudice and in such case the court may,
in its discretion, if it shall be of the opinion that the action was
vexatiously commenced, tax a reasonable attorney's fee as cost in
favor of the defendant, to be recovered of the plaintiff or his attorney."9 In Schwarz v. Ulmer,10 the trial court awarded defendants
$100.00 for alleged failure of plaintiff's attorney to serve a complaint on her within ten days of service of summons. The supreme
court, after reviewing the record, observed that there was "(1) no
evidence as to whether the complaint was or was not filed; (2) no
expression of the opinion by the court that the action was vexatiously commenced; (3) no evidence as to what amount would constitute a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as cost."'1 In reversing the award of $100.00 attorney's fee in favor of the defendant,
the court literally interpreted the provisions of Rule 3 (a) requiring
evidence of non-filing vexatiousness, and reasonability of attorney's
fee.
. Id. at 783.
3
6 Colo. R. Civ. P. (a).
7 375 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1962).
8 Colo. R. Civ. P. 3(b) provides: "The
complaint or service of3 summons."
9 Colo. R. Cir. P. (a).
10 370 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1962).
11 Id. at 896.

court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing the
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II. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Rule 8 (a) requires a jurisdictional statement in the complaint,
should the court be of limited jurisdiction. There were no Colorado
cases challenging the authority of a court of limited jurisdiction in
1962. Nevertheless, the question of jurisdiction of the court must be
considered concurrently with the question of sufficiency of the complaint. If the court in which the complaint is filed does not have
jurisdiction, the filing of that complaint becomes meaningless.
The question of the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter
did arise in 1962, as did the question of jurisdiction over the person
of defendants.
Jurisdiction over Subject Matter.-In Triebelhorn v. Turzanski, 12 the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the hornbook principles
12 370 P.2d 757 (Colo. 1962).
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that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at
any time and that a judgment entered in a case over which the
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. The
case involved an order of conveyance of real property which followed a final decree of divorce by more than a year. The final decree of divorce made no mention of division of property owned by
the parties nor did it reserve the matter for future consideration.
The trial court's order for conveyance of the real property was reversed and vacated. The court recited the argument of the petitioner that her former husband did not originally challenge the
order for conveyance, saying:
Such argument overlooks the rule that the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised
at any time, even for the first time in this Court, and that
a trial court which in fact lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot acquire jurisdiction even 13though the
parties expressly or impliedly consent thereto.
In September, 1962, the Colorado Supreme Court considered
the jurisdiction of state courts over the Southern Ute Tribe, a corporate entity. In Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 4 the plaintiff sued
the Indian tribe for damages for denying him membership in the
corporate entity and the benefits that flow therefrom. The tribe
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the courts of Colorado
have no jurisdiction over the subject matter; that any attempt by
a state court to determine the rights of membership in an Indian
tribe would be an invasion of the right of sovereignity of the tribethose rights being solely under the control of the tribe. The trial
court sustained the motion. The Colorado court recited that the
tribe had adopted a corporate charter wherein the tribe agreed:
"To sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction within the
United States. . .. "15 It concluded that adopting such provisions
and incorporating under 25 U.S.C. § 476, the tribe had rendered itself amenable to suit in Colorado courts. The court further cited
article II, section 6, of the Constitution of the State of Colorado,
guaranteeing protection of the courts of justice to all persons, and
cited the 14th amendment of the United S'ates Constitution. The
supreme court reversed the trial court's determination and directed
that the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court be denied. The
complexity of the constitutional issue raised by this case affords
interesting speculation as to what the United States Supreme Court
might decide should certiorari be granted.
Jurisdictionover the Person.-The question of jurisdiction over
the person of individuals did not arise in 1962. Usually, there is at
least one case involving the nonresident motorist statute. With a
recently amended nonresident motorist statute, 16 wherein residents
who have absented themselves from the state remain personally
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, it is surprising that the jurisdictional issue did not come before the Colorado Supreme Court
in 1962.
Jurisdiction over the person of corporations was twice consid13 Id. at 759.
14 374 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962).
15 Id. at 693.
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-8-5(ff) (1953).
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ered by the supreme court. The evasiveness of the "person" of a
corporation logically becomes the subject of much dispute. Generally, the Colorado court re-established a well known principle
that in order to subject a corporation to the jurisdiction of a Colorado court, the corporation must be "doing business" in Colorado.
Jurisdiction over the "person" by establishing "doing business"
must be established before service of process is effective. Merely
obtaining proper service of process without first establishing jurisdiction does not subject the corporation to jurisdiction of a Colorado
court.
Bay Aviation Services v. District Court 17 considers a suit wherein the summons and complaint were served on the Secretary of
State, under the Colorado Corporation Act, for damages against a
corporation as a result of an accident in an aircraft temporarily in
Colorado. The trial court held that the provisions of the Colorado
Corporations Act allowing service of process on the Secretary of
S t ate were complied with; that the corporation was not qualified to
do business in Colorado; that at the time of the accident the corporation was in Colorado for one instance; and that normally this
would not be sufficient to constitute "doing business" in Colorado.
Under the circumstances, however, it exercised its sound discretion
and denied the corporation's motion to quash. The Colorado Supreme Court, after review of the facts and the findings of the trial
court, found that the corporation was "not transacting business" or
"doing business" in Colorado, and hence the service of complaint
and summons in an action for death resulting from such accident
could not be made on the Secretary of State as agent for the corporation. Moreover, the court again affirmed that without jurisdiction of the person of the corporation, proper service of process was
ineffective. It should be added that the finding in the Bay Aviation
case establishes that a single transaction in Colorado, to wit: one
demonstration of an airplane, is not sufficient to establish "doing
business" for purposes of jurisdiction. The determination of the
question of the effect of a "single instance" not constituting doing
business has been long overdue and it now appears to be part of our
Colorado law.
A skeleton from the 1956 civil procedure closet again appeared
in the reporters in Bardahl Manufacturing Corp. v. District Court.18
In a prior case by the same name, 19 the supreme court ordered the
trial court to hear motions to dismiss and quash service. After this
order of the supreme court, the District Court of Jefferson County
heard motions to dismiss and to quash service and determined that
the court did not have jurisdiction over the corporation because the
corporation was not "doing business" in Colorado. After this determination, the plaintiff attempted to serve alias summons as a result
of evidence discovered in previous hearings. The corporation again
moved to quash and these subsequent motions were denied. At the
hearing on the motions to quash the second attempted service, the
corporation resisted attempted service on an attorney in open court.
The record was also devoid of new evidence that the corporation
was "doing business" in Colorado. The supreme court held that the
17 370 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1962).
18372 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1962).
19 Barclahl Manufacturing Corp. v. District Court, 134 Colo. 112, 300 P.2d 524 (1956).
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original determination that the corporation was not "doing business" ywas res judicata and that the new attempted service was ineffective for two reasons: there was no new evidence that the corporation was "doing business" after the res judicata determination,
and that service on an attorney in open court is improper unless
the attorney has been specifically authorized to accept service for
his client. It should be added that the supreme court taxed all costs
of the determination to that person attempting to get service, saying that the corporation cannot be required to resist void service of
process. There must be "doing business" by a corporation before
any attempt to serve process, although such process is properly
served, is effective.
Service of Process.-Once jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the persons in a lawsuit is established, service of process must
be properly made. Bay Aviation Services20 and Bardahl"21 clearly
show that service of process problems must follow jurisdictional
problems. Should the jurisdictional hurdles be jumped, the propriety of service of process can be reviewed.
In Bardahl, attempted service of process on an attorney for the
corporation was improper. "The law is well settled that attempted
service on an attorney in open court, or on an attorney who is appearing specially in a state, is improper unless the attorney has been
specifically authorized by his client to accept service. . . . The law
is clear that general employment as an attorney is' 22not sufficient
grounds to serve his client by serving the attorney.
In Martin v. District Court,2 a defendant contended that service of process was improper where the process server placed a copy
of the complaint and summons in an envelope and on the face of the
envelope wrote "Personal. To Isaac Mellman." The envelope was
delivered to Mr. Mellman's secretary and receptionist and the contents of the envelope were not explained to the secretary. The supreme court found that service was properly made on Mr. Mellman
according to Rule 4 (e) (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, saying:
This rule requires that the copy of the summons and
complaint be "delivered" to the proper person, but clearly
by its own terms does not require that this "delivery" be
accompanied by a reading aloud of the contents so served,
or by explaining what they are, or by verbally advising the
person sought to be served as to what he or she should do
with the papers.21
The court then concluded that service of process was completed by
the method above described.
This holding gives further meaning to Rule 4 (e) (1). The persons therein specified for personal service are, among others, a person's "stenographer, bookkeeper or chief clerk" (at his usual place
of business). Apparently, secretaries and receptionists are now
added to the list by judicial interpretation. Further, delivery of the
process in an envelope, as long as it is personally delivered, would
appear to effect proper service.
20
21
22
23
24

370
372
Id.
375
Id.

P.2d 752 (Colo. 1962).
P.2d 447 (Colo. 1962).
at 449.
P.2d 105 (Colo. 1962).
at 107.
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No cases appeared in the reporters involving service by publication or other methods of service to obtain in rem jurisdiction.
This is another surprise in view of the many cases on these subjects
found each of preceding years.
III.

MOTIONS DIRECTED TO THE COMPLAINT

Some of the problems of motions directed to a complaint have
been covered above. Motions challenging the jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person were filed in Triebelhorn, 5 Martinez,2e Bay Aviation Services, -7 Bardahl,"- and Martin."9 The motions in these cases were variously labeled Motion to Dismiss and
Motion to Quash. The Rules of Civil Procedure at Rule 12 (b) provide that the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and lack of jurisdiction over the person, together with insufficiency of process or service of process, should be filed before further responsive pleading. Then, properly, motions attacking jurisdiction necessarily attack the sufficiency of the complaint. The rules
do not tell us, however, the proper names which these motions
should bear and no consistency of practice has designated those
names. This writer would suggest that motions attacking jurisdiction should properly be labeled Motions to Dismiss on the grounds
alleged. Possibly, the supreme court will clarify this semantic problem for us in 1963.
Motion to Dismiss.-Colorado cases in 1962 showed the variety
of reasons for which a motion to dismiss may be filed under Rule
12 (b). For example, the trial court in Farmers Irrigation Co. v.
Game and Fish Comm'n,: ' granted a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by an adjudicated-owner of water rights against the
State Game and Fish Commission for diversion of waters. The supreme court held that the motion to dismiss was wrongly granted
in that a complaint alleging the diversion by the Commission, which
diversion polluted the water so as to render it unfit for the purposes
to which it had heretofore been applied by the plaintiff, stated a
claim for damage and destruction. Damages for taking property
without just compensation might be awarded if the facts were
established at trial.
The question of what matters may be considered on a motion
to dismiss was raised in Markoff v. Barenberg.' Therein, an assignment for benefit of creditors was made to one Connell. The plaintiff recorded his lien statement but filed no claim of the lien with
the assignee for the benefit of creditors. He did, however, file an
action to foreclose his lien. In the foreclosure suit, the assignee
moved to dismiss contending that it was Markoff's duty to file his
claim with the assignee. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss. The supreme court held that the complaint, on its face, stated
a good claim for relief. The court continued that the assignee for
benefit of creditors was seeking to avoid the claim under Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 11-1-1 (1953) on the grounds that the lienholder failed to
25 370
26374
27 370
28 372
29 375
30 369
31 368

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

757
691
752
447
105
557
964

(Colo.
(Colo.
(Colo.
(Colo.
(Colo.
(Colo.
(Colo.

1962).
1962).
1962).
1962).
1962).
1962).
1962).
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file the claim with the assignee and that he therefore lost his rights.
The court stated, however:
The matters raised by the motion to dismiss were in
the nature of avoidance, discharge and waiver, and were
therefore affirmative defenses which under Rule 8, R.C.P.
Colo., cannot be raised by motion but only by answer, the
plaintiff thereafter having the opportunity to raise and try
all issues concerning the force and effect of the particular
assignment, as well as that of the constitutionality of the
statute involved

.... :'-

The court concluded that it was error to dismiss the complaint on
a motion to dismiss.
A motion to dismiss is frequently filed attacking the capacity
of the plaintiff to bring the suit. Rule 17 (a) provides: "Every action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest . ..."

Following the spirit of this Rule, Tanner v. City of Boulder 33 involved a motion to dismiss attacking the propriety of parties plaintiff in an action challenging the validity of certain annexation and
zoning ordinances. The trial court dismissed the action on the
ground that the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved persons." The plaintiffs were both residents and taxpayers of the defendant City of
Boulder; and they alleged that they were adversely affected by the
ordinance in dispute. After citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-11-6 (1953),
which grants "aggrieved persons" the right to relief in annexation
proceedings, the court concluded that the plaintiff residents and
taxpayers had a right to be heard under the authority granted by
the statute, saying:
Their complaint made a prima facie showing of a violation of the city charter in the adoption of the questicned
ordinance. As taxpayers and residents asserting that 'hey
had been adversely affected thereby,
they had the ri-ht to
34
challenge the ordinance in question.
A dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice McWilliams, who
concluded that the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved" persons within
the meaning of the statute. The statute applies only to landowners
in the area annexed or sought to be annexed, "and does not include,
as the majority has applied it, to the tens of thousands of residents,
taxpayers and landowners in the City of Boulder."' ,
The district court, in an appeal from the county court on a
claim filed in the decedent's estate, dismissed the appeal on 'he
ground that the administrator was not "a person aggrieved" in
Gushurst v. Benham.3 6 Although this case does not involve the
motion to dismiss as above described, it provides authority which
could be used in arguing a motion to dismiss on real party in interest grounds. It holds that an administrator is a "person aggrieved"
under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-6-10 (1953) for purposes of appeal from
the county court to the district court in estate proceedings where
a claim is allowed in a decedent's estate which is covered by insurance indemnity although the insurance policy is the only asset of
32 Id.
:33 377
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 376

at 965.
P.2d 945 (Colo. 1962).
at 946.
at 948.
P.2d 687 (Colo. 1962).
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the estate. The supreme court held that the allowance of the claim
in the estate for injuries done at the hand of the decedent put the
estate in a worse position than when the estate was opened and,
therefore, the administrator was a "person aggrieved."
Gayton v. Department of Highways3 7 sets forth the basic test
for governing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Quoting from Dillinger v. North Sterling Irrigation District3 8 the court
recited: "In passing on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim, the court must consider only those matters stated
within the four corners thereof. '39 After reciting the axiom "that
for the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss the matters in the
complaint are assumed to be true," the court affirmed the trial
court's action granting the motion to dismiss. This was an action for
damages by a property owner against the Department of Highways
for erecting a bridge at the end of an alley which presumably cut
off one means of access to the plaintiff's property. The court said:
It is obvious that by the erection of this barricade at
the east end of the alley Gayton has not been deprived of
all access to her property, and that despite the barricade
she still has reasonable access to the street system of Pueblo. Such being the case, she necessarily was unable to plead
any special damage and her complaint therefore does not
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.4 0
Motion for More Definite Statement.-In Gayton above, the
defendant could presumably have moved for a more definite statement or bill of particulars under Rule 12 (e). This would be on the
authority of Rule 9 (g), which states: "when items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." Instead, a motion
to dismiss was proper in the absence of pleading the special damages required as the court noted.
In Bernstein v. Dun & Bradstreet,41 a motion for more definite
statement was filed to the libel complaint and granted. The more
definite statement which was filed indicated a libel per quod not a
libel per se. In neither the complaint nor more definite statement
were special damages pleaded. After an opportunity for leave to
file an amended complaint, which opportunity was not followed by
37
38
39
40
41

367
135
See
Id.
368

P.2d 899 (Colo. 1962).
Colo. 100, 308 P.2d 608 (1957).
note 37, supra.
at 902-03.
P.2d 780 (Colo. 1962).
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appropriate pleading on the part of the plaintiff, the trial court
granted a motion to dismiss the action. The court then stated:
Since special damages are an essential element of an
action for libel per quod . . . plaintiff was required to specifically plead them. Having failed to do so the trial court
could then have dismissed the plaintiff's complaint under
Rule 12 (b) (5), R.C.P. Colo., for failure to state a claim
42
upon which relief could be granted ....
The supreme court affirmed dismissal for the above reasons.
IV.

CHANGE OF VENUE

Under Rule 98, a motion for change of venue is properly filed
to the complaint before responsive pleading. According to Rule
98(e), failure to file a motion for change of venue, together with
motions under Rule 12 (b), the right to file such motions is waived.
Again, it is surprising that 1962 found no change of venue cases.
V.

INTERVENTION

Under Rule 24 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, certain
persons may apply for permission to intervene in a lawsuit. Because
intervention adds parties to a lawsuit who were not contemplated
by the original parties, the court adopted Rule 24 and has on frequent occasions interpreted its rule. One interpretation is found in
Denver Chap. of the Colorado Motel Ass'n v. City and County of
Denver.43 The motel association, contending that it had the right to
intervene under Rule 24 (a), petitioned to intervene in a suit instituted by the City and County of Denver against Thomas G. Currigan, as auditor of the city. The suit sought to compel the auditor to
sign a contract with an architect for advice and analysis of proposals for a contemplated hotel operation at Stapleton Airfield in
Denver. The intervenors, individual taxpayers and representatives
of a class of taxpayers, contended that they had an absolute right
to intervene in that they would be bound by a judgment in the action and in that they would not be adequately represented by existing parties in the suit, all of which is required by Rule 24(a). The
court again affirmed the requirements of Rule 24(a) for intervention of right, saying:
An application for intervention under Rule 24(a) (2)
must show both that the representation of his interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and that the applicant is or may be bound by the judgment in the action, and
neither element, standing alone, is sufficient. If either fac44
tor is missing, there is no absolute right of intervention.
The court found from statements in the intervenor's brief, and from
the other evidence, that the intervenors would be adequately represented in the action. One of the requirements for intervention of
right lacking, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial
of intervention. The court added in the last paragraph of its opinion
the following language which goes far in setting forth tests under
Rule 24 (a): "In the absence of such factors as fraud, collusion, bad
42 Id. at 782.

43 374 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1962).
44 Id. at 496.
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faith and the
like, a taxpayer cannot intervene as a matter of abso'45
lute right.
VI. THE ANSWER
After determination of preliminary matters by motion as above
outlined, the question of proper pleading by defendant in his answer should be considered.
As reported above in Markoff v. Barenberg,46 certain matters in
the nature of avoidance, discharge and waiver must be pleaded in
the defendant's answer and are not properly raised by motion. Rules
8 (b) and 8 (c) set forth the details of the defenses. Markoff establishes that failing to file a claim with an assignee for the benefit of
creditors, as required under the statutes, is such a matter of avoidance that must be raised by answer.
One of the affirmative defenses required to be raised by answer47
under Rule 8 (c) is "estoppel." Beery v. American Liberty Ins. Co.
affirms the general principle that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be
invoked against any governmental agency acting in its public capacity.
Rule 8 (c) provides: "Any mitigating circumstances to reduce
the amount of damages shall be affirmatively pleaded," and Rule
13 outlines the procedure for asserting counterclaims and setoffs.
In Transport Clearings of Colorado, Inc. v. Linstedt,4 8 a "counterclaim" was set up in a defendant's answer against the claim of a
collection agency. The collection agency was the assignee of the
person against whom the counterclaim was directed. The agency
contended that the term "counterclaim" was improper and that a
counterclaim could not be asserted against an assignee. The collection agency insisted that the title of the claim set forth in the answer should have been "set off." The court observed: "De minimis
non curat lex. This is an $18.00 tempest over a tea cart. ' 4 9 In dismissing the collection agency's contention, the court recited Rule 8 (c),
which states: "When a party has mistakenly designated a defense
as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on
terms, if justice so required, shall treat the pleadings as if there had
been a proper designation."
In an action on a promissory note, the defendant in Bernklau
v. Stevense0 failed to affirmatively plead "failure of consideration"
by answer. The defendant merely denied the indebtedness, alleged
a tender of an installment payment and counterclaimed for damages as a result of breach of certain covenants. On writ of error, the
defendant urged failure of consideration, which was sustained in
the evidence. The supreme court dismissed this argument, saying:
Defendants, however, must also fail here for they cannot avoid application of the rule that failure of consideration is an affirmative defense which, if not pleaded, is
waived. Colo. R.C.P. Rule 8 (c) and Rule 12 (h). A careful
review of the record in this case indicates that such defense
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
368
375
376
Id.
371

at 496.
P.2d 964 (Colo. 1962).
P.2d 93 (Colo. 1962).
P.2d 518 (Colo. 1962).
at 518.
P.2d 765 (Colo. 1962).
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was neither pleaded nor raised at any stage of the trial
court proceeding. 51
Rule 8(c) requires that the defense of "res judicata" shall be
set forth affirmatively in the answer, or other responsive pleading.
Literally, res judicata means "thing decided. ' 52 The defense of res
judicata was raised a number of times before the supreme court in
1962.
In a water rights' priority case, a prior action in which claims
for certain water priorities were waived was res judicata.5 : In a
damage suit for failure to deliver corporate stock, the United States
District Court arbitration award was res judicata on the issue of
the plaintiff's rights to the stock involved.5 4 In the stock case, the
court commented:
The trial court mistakenly took the position that the
United States District Court judgment was not res judicata
of the issue before it because the parties were not identical
since Hudson was not a party to that suit. What the court
overlooked is that the parties need not be identical if their
interests are identical, or if the party to the action is in
privity with
the party later asserting the doctrine of res
55
judicata.
Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co. 56 establishes that successors in interest
to original appropriators of water rights are in privity with those
original appropriators and a decree entered with respect to the original appropriators is res judicata against the successors. A prior
determination of the state of title to real property was res judicata
in an action to quiet title and cancellation of deeds where the same
Burton was a party to both proceedings.5 7 In an estate proceeding,
the judgment entered by the county court, affirmed by the district
court, and to which judgment writ of error was dismissed, was res
judicata on a later attempt to raise the same issues in the county
court by objection to the final report of the administratrix. 5s
VII.

SERVICE OF PLEADINGS DURING COURSE OF CASE

After the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the persons in any lawsuit, service of pleadings and other
papers is governed by Rule 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Service under Rule 5 is less formal than service to obtain jurisdiction
which is prescribed by Rule 4. The Colorado Supreme Court twice
construed the provisions of Rule 5.
In Gould and Preisner,Inc. v. District Court,5 9 Gould and Preisner filed "Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Complaint" but failed
to serve a copy of this pleading upon the other parties to the action.
At the pre-trial conference, Gould and Preisner moved for leave to
serve other defendants with the pleading, supporting the motion by
alleging that the trial had just previously been set, that the omission was a result of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect
51 Id. at 770.
52 77 C.J.S., page 274.
53 Alloy v. Stino, 370 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1962).
54 Hudson v. Western Oil Fields, Inc., 374 P.2d 403 (Colo. 1962).
55 Id. at 405,
56 371 P.2d 775 (Colo. 1962).
57 Burton v. Garner, 374 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1962).
58 Clark v. Willis, 368 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1962).
59 369 P.2d 554 (Colo. 1962).

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL.

XL

and that the other parties would not be prejudiced. The trial court
denied Gould and Preisner's motion to serve the pleading. The supreme court reversed the trial court by finding that failure to serve
the pleading was an inadvertent omission of counsel which could be
corrected without prejudice to the rights of any other litigant involved in the action and stated:
To uphold the action of the trial court under the circumstances above set forth would deprive the petitioners
of claimed property rights and might well result in an unjust enrichment of other creditors whose claims may not
be such as to entitle them to preference over the petitioner 0
VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS BEFORE TRIAL

An attorney attempted to withdraw his appearance in Holland
v. Holland.61 The records show that the attorney's client was in
Spain, that the client had no other counsel and that the trial court
would be handicapped in its efforts to make proper orders in the
interests of a minor child. The supreme court found no error in the
trial court's denying leave to withdraw thereby sustaining the discretion of the trial court in acting upon the motion. In this divorce
proceeding, which involved the custody of a minor child, the test
appears to be whether the trial court used its discretion in acting
on the motion for leave to withdraw as attorney of record.
More than three months after counsel had entered his appearance in a negligence case, a motion under Rule 97 to disqualify the
trial judge was filed in Dominic Leone Const. Co. v. District
Court.6 2- The grounds appeared to be the relationship of the judge

with one of the attorneys in the suit. A trial court postponed ruling
on the motion to disqualify, reserving i's ruling until the matter
was at issue. The court cited Rule 97 and paraphrased it as follows:
"Upon filing of the motion to disqualify then 'thereupon all other
proceedings in the case . . . [were] suspended until . . . [the] ruling
. . . [was] made thereon.' ",6 The supreme court ordered that the

trial court suspend all the proceedings other than to rule upon the
motion to disqualify and warned:
From the record now before us it appears that the motion to disqualify the trial judge was filed more than three
months after counsel entered their appearance in the case.
The grounds now claimed for disqualification were then
known to counsel for defendant, nothwithstanding which
they filed motions and initiated proceedings concerned
with the merits of the action. Better practice dictates that a
motion to disqualify
be filed promptly when the grounds
64
are known.

IX.

SEPARATE TRIALS

Only minutes before empaneling a jury, the defendant orally
moved that the plaintiff's two claims be separately tried for the
reason that it would be highly prejudicial to have the two causes
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 557.
373 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1962).
370 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 760.
Ibid.
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of action tried in the same case.6 The motion was denied. Rule
42 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "The court in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim. . . ." In holding that 'here was no error
committed by the trial court in denying the belated and untimely
motion, the supreme court said:
The rule is permissive, not mandatory, and vests in the
trial court considerable discretion as to whether there shall
be a separate trial for each claim of a multiple claim complaint. . . In the instant case, seven months lapsed between the time this case was "at issue" and the time when
it came on for trial. No request for a separate trial was ever
interposed until only moments before the commencement
of the trial proper. Under such circumstances Lamirato's
counsel had the right to assume that there would be a trial
of all issues framed by the complaint and the answers, and
presumably all readied for trial on this premise. 66
X.

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

1962 saw greater use of the pre-trial conference which is provided by Rule 16. The separate district courts of the state have enacted local rules of procedure, many of which provide for the use
of pre-trial conferences in every case. It was then reasonable to expect that the supreme court would be called upon to interpret the
enabling provisions of Rule 16 (allowing pre-trial conferences) and
the specific exercises of power by the various district courts under
their local rules of procedure governing pre-trial conferences.
Local Rule 5 of the District Court Rules for the Second Judicial
District (Denver) precipitated an order in the nature of a contempt
citation directed to two Denver attorneys in Pittman v. District
Court. 67 On the time appointed for the pre-trial conference, the attorneys appeared in court without a written pre-trial statement as
required by local Rule 5 (g) (2). The pre-trial conference was continued pending submission of said written statement. At the continued conference, a statement was tendered by one of the attorneys which the court observed did not follow the rule mentioned.
After the continued conference, the court entered a nunc pro tunc
order that the offending attorneys pay $150.00 into the Registry of
the Court. After this order, the principal suit was settled and stipulation was presented to the court waiving any claim to the $150.00
ordered. The court refused to approve the stipulation for dismissal,
contending that the $150.00 ordered was in the nature of a disciplinary action. Attorneys against whom the $150.00 was assessed proceeded by original writ in the nature of mandamus praying that
the trial court be ordered to approve the stipulation for dismissal.
The supreme court observed that local rules of procedure contain
wide departures from former practice and that such rules were
adopted to expedite the transactions of judicial business. The court
stated: "To the extent that the rules of the district court in the several judicial districts are consistent with the Rules of Civil Proce65 Moseley v. Lomirato, 370 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1962).
66 Id. at 455.
67 369 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1962).
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dure adopted by this court, they will be upheld by us.'"'6 The court
commented that in a given case there might be a situation where
the trial court could properly take appropriate action against any
attorney obstructing the progress of the case. The court concluded
that, under the circumstances, "disciplinary action" by the imposition of the $150.00 fine was not a result of a direct contempt and
that "no appropriate proceedings in contempt have been conducted
in this case." The court then directed that the trial court dismiss
the action in accordance with the stipulation of the parties.
Another case involving Rule 5 of the Denver District Court
local rules of procedure caused the supreme court to assume original jurisdiction."' In this case, provisions of the local rule providing that a form of pre-trial order be "approved as to form and content" by the attorneys for the various parties was construed. Counsel for one of the parties refused to sign the pre-trial order approving the content but agreed to sign: "approved as to form only." He
contended that approval as to "form and content" amounts to approval in substance of all things recited in the order. In effect, it
nullifies all objections and exceptions which may have been made
to the rulings of the court at the pre-trial conference. The supreme
court first commented on the rule, saying:
We hold that said local rule of the court is neither contrary to, in conflict with, nor in excess of the limitations or
grants of Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but
rather follows the mandate of and carries out the in'ended
application and effectiveness of said Rules of Civil Procedure, in that said Rule 16 commands that the court "shall
make an order which recites the action taken at the conference ...."70
Secondly, the court stated:
The approval of the "substance" of the order is neither
approval by counsel of the legal effect of the order nor of
the application of substantive law which may appear in
said pre-trial order, but rather, is an approval only 71of a
recital of what transpired at the pre-trial conference.
68 Id. at 90.
69 Albright . District Court, 375 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1962).
70 td. at 687.
71 Ibid.
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Lastly, the court observed that the purpose of the pre-trial conference is to narrow issues and to simplify the conduct of the trial and
does not waive later objections.
By the language of these cases, the supreme court would appear to be approving local rules of procedure in the Denver District
Court. It would also appear, from the language of the court, that
use of a pre-trial conference, and those things specifically provided
for implementation of it, are approved by the Colorado Supreme
Court.
The binding effect of the pre-trial order was forcefully seen in
two Colorado cases. In McNelley v. Smith, 72 the trial court refused
to admit certain photographs in evidence inasmuch as they were
not submitted at the pre-trial conference nor were they furnished
to adverse parties within a reasonable time prior to trial as provided in the pre-trial order. The supreme court approved the trial
court's action in refusing the photographs; the pre-trial order controls the subsequent course of the action. In Robinson v. Crosson,"s
the pre-trial order, which was approved by the parties, determined
that the only issue to be resolved was that relating to the construction of a retaining wall. The court observed:
Since the trial court failed to adjudicate the issue
which the court and the parties, in a pre-trial conference,
agreed was the only one before it, we have before us, in
effect, a record revealing an incomplete disposition of the
case. Piecemeal relief was actually granted here. The whole
controversy should have been resolved unitarily, since
whatever relief could or should have been granted74 in the
case was dependent upon possible offsetting claims.
A new trial was ordered for the trial court to hear the sole issue
presented in the pre-trial conference and reflected by the order.
The pre-trial conference is here to stay. Rule 16 is being continually interpreted. A labyrinth of law is being announced regarding
the pre-trial procedure which is giving meaning, breadth and scope
to pre-trial proceedings. Pre-trial conferences and orders necessarily entered thereafter are proper, binding and enforceable within
the limitation of Rule 16.
XI.

CONTINUANCE

While the granting of a continuance is not the specific subject
of any rule of civil procedure, a continuance is an important question for civil procedure. Schwarz v. Ulmer 75- considers the denial of
defendant's request for a continuance. In this quiet-title suit, defendants requested continuance for purpose of presenting testimony
of one of the defendants, a mining engineer, who was seriously ill
and as a consequence was unavailable as a witness. The supreme
court remanded to the district court for further proceedings, stating:
We find that the action of the trial court in denying
defendants' request for a continuance under the circum72 368
73 368
74 Id.
75 370

P.2d 555 (Colo. 1962).
P.2d 791 (Colo. 1962).
at 792.
P.2d 889 (Colo. 1962).
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stances here presented is arbitrary and an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.
Trial was to the court, and certainly the matter could
have been continued, on the terms if considered proper,
without injury or appreciable inconvenience to anyone, and
to the end that the court might have before it all of the
available facts witn reference to the very matter on which
it held the evidence was insufficient .... 76
XII.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56 provides that summary judgment may be granted if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
under Rule 12 (b), may be treated as a motion for summary judgment if matters outside the pleading are presented. Under these
provisions of the rules, two Colorado cases were decided in 1962.
Welp v. Crews77 was a case wherein summary judgment of dismissal was granted upon the pleading, depositions, answer to interrogatories and affidavits. The action was for damages as a result
of loss of a loan commitment. The supreme court upheld the granting of the motion for summary judgment, finding that from depositions, one of which was plaintiff's, there was no loss of the loan
commitment because of any act of the defendants. This crucial issue
being established, the summary judgment was proper. The supreme
court rejected the contention of the plaintiff that summary judgment was premature in that the defendant had not filed an answer.
The court specifically found that Rule 56 does not require that a
defendant plead before he files a motion for summary judgmen t .
Summary judgment for the plaintiff in Walker v. Calada Materials Co. 7 8 was reversed and the cause remanded for trial. Summary judgment in this action on a foreign judgment was granted
upon tender of an exemplified copy of the California judgment
together with the motion for summary judgment. An affidavit in
opposition was filed by the defendant, stating that the alleged judgment attached to the motion for summary judgment was insufficient and denying that he ever authorized one Poppler to appear in
his behalf in the Califonria proceeding. Plaintiffs contended that,
pursuant to Rule 44 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. the official
record was presented to the court and hence formed the basis for
the summary judgment. The court observed:
Rule 44(a) R.C.P. Colo. tells how an official record, be
it one kept in or out of Colorado, may be evidenced, but
does not purport to prescribe what must be established in
order to prevail in an action based on a foreign judgment.
Accordingly, the summary judgment entered in favor of
Calada was
improvident and erroneous and it is therefore
79
reversed.
Although the court did not specifically recite, it would appear that
the affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment filed by the
76
77
78
79

Id. at 895.
368 P.2d 426 (Colo. 1962).
375 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 681.
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defendant sufficiently made an issue of the California judgment
and hence the mere proof of that judgment according to Rule 44 (a)
was not sufficient to meet the test of Rule 56 that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact.
XIII.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Rule 59 provides that: "A new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties, and on all or part of the issues, after trial by
jury, court or master." Thereafter follows a list of causes for which
a new trial may be granted. One of those grounds is "newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial. '' st Two Colorado cases interpret this ground
for a new trial.
In Hudson v. American Foundry Life Ins. Co. of Denver,;" the
corporation brought an action against the president for effecting
exchange of corporate stock for stock of a second corporation which
became bankrupt. The president argued in his motion for a new
trial that newly discovered evidence had been found. That newly
discovered evidence established acceptance of shares of stock as an
accord and satisfaction of a claim arising out of the exchange. The
journal entries of the corporate books were specifically recited. The
court again announced the well established rule that granting or
denying of a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence rests largely in the counter-discretion of the trial
court. In the absence of abuse of that discretion, it will not be disturbed. The court then determined that the newly discovered evidence was merely corroborative and cumulative. It concluded: "We
also have held that a trial court should deny a motion for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence when such alleged
evidence
would be only cumulative and would not change the re2
sult."s

A motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was denied, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
order, in Myers v. Myers.s3 After the verdict was rendered, the losing party discovered that one of the witnesses had made statements
contrary to that which he testified in the trial. The court then observed:
No indication of surprise was then expressed by counsel, and no effort made to have the witness modify his testimony. A plaintiff cannot impeach his own witness in such
circumstances, and not having claimed surprise at the time
the testimony was taken, he is in no position to inject a
claim of newly discovered evidence as a means
of overcom4
ing the effect of his witnesses' testimonys
The defendant's choice between additur and a new trial was
5
considered in Herzog v. Murad.s
The verdict was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff in the amount of $500.00; the trial court ordered an
additur in the sum of $6,500.00. In the event that the defendant did
So
81
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not elect to accept this additur, a new trial would have been ordered on the issue of damages alone. Defendants elected the new
trial and the trial court forthwith entered judgment for $7,000.00
in favor of the plaintiff (the verdict of $500.00 plus the $6,500.00
additur). The supreme court reversed the judgment and ordered a
new trial, observing that the trial court did not translate its order
into judgment. The clear terms of the order required a new trial
if the additur was not accepted. Significant in the decision is that
the supreme court did not object to the procedure of offering the
alternative of additur or new trial.
XIV. FINAL JUDGMENT TO WHICH WRIT OF ERROR MAY LIE
It is axiomatic that writ of error will lie only to a final judgment. Rule 111 so specifically states, adding other situations where
writ of error will lie. Additionally, Rule 59(f) states: "The party
claiming error in the trial of any cause must, unless otherwise directed by the trial court, move that court for a new trial, and, without such order, only questions presented in such motion will be considered on review."
In a suit for injunction to prevent a water company from discontinuing water service, the trial court denied the request for injunction and entered judgment for defendant. 6 No motion for new
trial or order dispensing with such motion was filed or entered. The
supreme court dismissed the writ of error to the trial court's order
denying the injunction, saying: "Under the Rules of Civil Procedure a new trial or an order dispensing therewith is a prerequisite
to the right of a party to review in this court. This rule applies in
cases where a review is sought of a pure question of law as well
8s7
as questions of fact.
In a personal injury action,88 defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim was granted. There was nothing in the record to indicate that a judgment was entered or a motion for new trial filed or dispensed with. The supreme court dismissed the writ of error without prejudice to pursuing further appropriate proceedings in the trial court. These two 1962 cases follow
a line of Colorado cases which have established that, under Rule
59 (f), a motion for new trial or an order dispensing therewith is
an absolute prerequisite to issuance of writ of error. As the 1962
cases show, it does not seem to matter which of the listed types of
orders in Rule 111 to which writ of error will issue are involved.
The motion for new trial must still be made."9 It might be observed
that the decisions establishing the necessity of a motion for a new
trial have gone beyond the plain words of Rule 59 (f). The rule does
not state that the motion must be made before writ of error will
issue. Rather it only limits the questions to be heard on review. The
words of the rule to the contrary notwithstanding, it appears that
judicial interpretation continues to make a motion for a new trial,
or an order dispensing therewith, an absolute prerequisite to review
of any action of the trial court.
q6
S7
88
89

Helmick v. Consolidated Mutual Water Co., 372 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 161.
Carroll v. Fitzsimmons, 371 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1962).
In the Helmick case, an order denying an injunction (Rule 111(a)( 3 ) ) was involved.
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The motion for new trial has a double-edged importance. In
°
Andrews v. Hayward,1
the trial court granted a new trial. Thereafter, defendants caused a writ of error to be issued. The supreme
court, in dismissing the writ of error, cited an earlier Colorado case
to the effect that there is no final judgment to which writ of error
may lie if the motion for a new trial has been granted. The case
must await retrial before a final judgment exists to which the writ
may lie.
The question of piecemeal review was considered in Hamm v.
Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Co." t The supreme court had issued writs of error to two different cases involving the asserted
ownership of ditch easements. The two cases appeared to be inextricably interwoven with the general dispute between the parties. One
of the writs of error was dismissed because no final judgment had
been decreed therein. The plaintiff in error therefore moved to dismiss the present writ of error, without prejudice, and to direct the
trial court to further proceed in the two cases together. The supreme court dismissed the writ, at the plaintiff-in-error's request,
citing Rule 54 (b). This rule allows the trial court to enter final
judgment upon one, or more, but less than all of the claims, on certain conditions, where more than one claim exists. The supreme
court observed that it discouraged piecemeal review of a cause and
expressed an opinion that the two cases involved should be heard
together. It then found that the requirement for piecemeal review
found in Rule 54 (b) (the determination that there is no just reason
for delay) was not met. The writ of error was dismissed, without
prejudice. It is interesting to note that Rule 54 (b) generally applies
to orders of the trial court rather than the issues originally recognized by the supreme court. In the present case, the rule was originally exercised by the supreme court.
XV.

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT

Not every question will be reviewed by the supreme court on
error. A number of Colorado cases decided in 1962 reaffirm this
principle.
In

Shows v. Silverfield Mining and Milling Co.,9 2 various

grounds for reversal were urged in the briefs, which grounds were
not asserted in the motion for new trial. The motion for a new trial
merely stated: "Errors of law were committed in instructing the
jury and in ruling on the inadmissibility of evidence." The court
sta t ed: "Such general assignments of error do not comply with the
mandate of Rule 59 (f) R.C.P. Colo. which provides that only questions presented in the motion for a new trial will be considered on
review. "' 3 Again, the importance of Rule 59 (f) is underlined. In
the Shows case, the true meaning of Rule 59 (f) is mirrored.
In his motion for new trial, the defendant waived the question
of tender of payment in a negotiable instruments case before the
trial.!4 The supreme court held that having waived the issue in the
trial court, the defendant could not reassert it on error.
90
91
92
93
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To review a judgment, the supreme court must have a transcript of the record of the proceedings in the trial court before it.
Without the transcript, the supreme court cannot proceed to a determination of the issues. For example, in Bourne v. Rose,95 the reporter's transcript was not lodged in apt time and was not approved
by the trial judge. The supreme court therefore refused to consider
the transcript on error. Likewise, in Burton v. Garner,96 the court
stated: "There being no transcript before us we cannot consider
this ground of asserted error. In its absence we are bound to presume that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are correct
and that the evidence presented supports the judgment. '97 In Jensen v. South Adams County Water Dist.,98 certain statements of defendant's counsel regarding one of the medical witnesses in closing
argument was urged as grounds for a mistrial which have been
granted. The court observed that, in the absence of a transcript of
the argument complained of, the court could not consider the issue.
Finally, in White v. White,"9 in the absence of an offer of proof as
provided under Rule 43 (c), the supreme court could not determine
whether certain testimony was improperly excluded by the trial
court. This decision urged the importance of making the offer of
proof pursuant to Rule 43 (c) in order to perfect a record in the supreme court.
Camenisch v. Nuccitelli'0 0 asserted an axiomatic principle. Writ
of error was dismissed where the plaintiff in error had suffered no
95
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adverse ruling. The court held that the plaintiff in error had no
standing to bring error.
The basic principle of appellate review was asserted in Walker
v. Casto.101 The court stated: "It is presumed that the trial court
correctly applied the law to the facts under consideration, and the
burden is upon the persons who claim error to their prejudice to
show wherein the court erred." -' As a corollary to this, five 1962
cases reaffirm the time-honored principle that the findings of the
trial court on disputed issues of fact will not be disturbed when
supported by competent evidence. 10"
Problems involving the record on error, which are covered by
Rule 112, were raised in Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co.
of Denver.11 4 Rule 112 requires that a party who seeks reversal of
a judgment shall lodge the reporter's transcript with the clerk of
the trial court. Thereafter, objection may be made to the transcript.
In the present case, the reporter in the trial court died before transcribing his notes making it necessary for others to complete the
transcription. The plaintiff in error, who had the burden of lodging
the transcript, argued that the record was "uncertain." Nevertheless, pursuant to Rule 112 (f), the trial judge certified the transcript
which was finally prepared. The plaintiff-in-error produced no evidence or sworn testimony contradicting any portion of the transcript. The supreme court dismissed the objection to the record and
proceeded to determine the matter on the record as certified.
XVI. RELIEF OF JUDGMENT
An often misunderstood remedy under Rule 60 was interpreted
twice by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1962. Rule 60 (b) provides:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or
proceeding for the following reasons. . . ." Frequently this rule is
confused with the motion for a new trial provided at Rule 59. Burson v. Burson'0 5 clarified the purpose of Rule 60. In this case, a decree of divorce and order of custody for a minor child was entered
without contest. Nothing was said in the decree regarding alimony.
Nine months after entry of the decree of divorce, the wife filed a
motion to fix alimony payments. The trial court dismissed the wife's
motion, denying her alimony, and the wife sought review by writ
of error. Since the provided time for issuance of writ of error had
expired, the court noted that "(Rule 60 (b)) permits the court to
relieve a party from a final judgment or order for 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.' ,1o6 The court then stated,
"Any right to modify the original judgment in light of the allegations contained in the motion would arise from this portion of Rule
60. But such relief must be
sought 'not more than 6 months after
'
judgment.' R.C.P. Colo.60. 117
In another domestic relations case, respondent filed a motion
101 372 P.2d 438 (Colo. 1962).
102 Id. at 440.
103 Watson v. Settlemeyer, 376 P.2d 453 (Colo. 1962); Denton v. Kumpf, 373 P.2d 306
1962); Heckel v. Heckel, 373 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1962); Cline v. Whitten, 372 P.2d 145 (Colo.
People v. Cooke, 370 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1962).
104 377 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1962).
105 369 P.2d 979 (Colo. 1962).
106 Id. at 980.
107 Ibid.
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under Rule 60 (b) to vacate the trial court's judgment and order
regarding support for a minor child. The motion was filed about
twenty-five months following decree of judgment.10 8 The court,
quoting from an earlier Colorado decision, 10 9 said: "Such motion
[under Rule 60], in any event, is directed to the discretion of the
trial court, and when one files such a motion he admits for all practical purposes that the judgment is in all respects regular on the
face of the record, but asserts that the record would show differently except for mistake,1 1inadvertence, or excusable neglect on behalf of counsel or client." "
Both of the above cases arise under Rule 60 inasmuch as direct
appellate review by writ of error was foreclosed. The three-month
time limitation had run. Properly, a motion under Rule 60 (b) is
the remedy afforded one whose time for direct appellate review has
expired and who can come within the listed provisions of Rule
60 (b).
XVII.
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That curious and mysterious area of "original proceedings"
again had its test in the Colorado Supreme Court in 1962. Rule 106
abolishes the special forms of pleading and writs of quo warranto,
certiorari and prohibition, among other writs. However, we continue to see reports of these writs being granted both in the supreme court and in the inferior courts. For example, thirteen such
"original proceedings" were reported in 1962. Sometimes, the proceedings are attended with the names of the common law writs; at
other times the proceedings bear the title "in the nature of Writ
of . . ."; and more frequently the proceedings are merely called "original proceedings." Rule 106 (a), by its five subdivisions, describes
relief which could be labeled by common law terminology. Hence,
it is proper that the supreme court grant this relief. And the supreme court did grant such relief in 1962; eight times by prohibition, 1' twice by mandamus, 112 once by certiorari' 1" and once by
quo warranto.' 14 In addition, the supreme court entertained an original proceeding for issuance of prerogative or remedial writ to
require the general assembly to reapportion."- The substance of the
relief granted in each case is fully reported under other subdivisions of this review.
The Colorado Supreme Court in 1962 considered and interpreted the more active rules of civil procedure. The court was consistent with prior rulings in the area of civil procedure and added
another year of decisions to assist in a predictable and orderly administration of just remedies in the courts of record of the state of
Colorado.
108 Rabies v. People, 373 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1962).
109 Johnson v. Johnson, 132 Colo. 236, 287 P.2d 49 (1955).
110 Rabies v. People, note 108 supra, at 702.
111 Gould and Preisner v. District Court, 369 P.2d 554 (Colo. 1962); Board of Directors v. Jeffrey,
370 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1962); Boy Aviation Services v. District Court, 370 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1962);
Dominic v. District Court, 370 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1962); District Attorney v. District Court, 371 P.2d
271 (Colo. 1962); Bardahl v. District Court. 372 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1962); Martin v. District Court, 375
P.2d 105 (Colo. 1962); Albriaht v. District Court, 375 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1962).
112 Treat v. McDonough, 367 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1962); Pitman v. District Court, 369 P.2d 85 (Colo.
1962).
113 Berry v. Parole Board, 367 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1962).
114 People v. Lakehurst, 373 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1962).
115 In the Matter of Legislative Reapportionment, Stein v. General Assembly, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo.
1962).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
By

AUSTIN W.

SCOTT, JR.*

During 1962 the Colorado Supreme Court decided more than
forty cases' concerned with criminal law and procedure, including
some cases dealing with violations of municipal ordinances. In
addition, the 1962 Colorado Legislature enacted a few statutes
on criminal law and procedure; and the Colorado Supreme Court
in late December of 1962 adopted several amendments to the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, these amendments to be effective on January 1, 1963. All three types of law-case law, statutory
law and court rules-are covered by this article.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

A. Municipal Ordinance Violations
The famous

Merris case 2

of 1958 contained two important

propositions: (1) The municipal penal ordinance of a home rule
city creates a crime, not a mere civil wrong, if there exists a
counterpart state statute punishing the same conduct or if the
ordinance authorizes imprisonment as punishment.3 (2) When
a state criminal statute punishes conduct of statewide concern,
the home rule city lacks the power to enact a penal ordinance
punishing the same conduct 4 (and conversely, when a home rule
city has enacted a penal ordinance punishing conduct of local
concern, a state statute punishing the same conduct is inapplicable to such conduct committed within the municipal territorial
limits).
As to the first proposition, a 1962 case broadens it somewhat..5
"Imposition of criminal sanctions," the court says, "makes them
[municipal violations] crimes."' "Criminal sanctions" is an expression which would seem to be broad enough to include a fine as
well as imprisonment, so that a muncipal violation for which a
fine is the only authorized punishment may nevertheless be a
crime, to be prosecuted in accordance with the law relating to
criminal procedure for minor offenses.
Two events which occurred in 1961 have brought about a
drastic limitation upon the second of the two propositions. A
1961 case recognized that conduct is not necessarily purely local
or exclusively statewide; that some types of conduct partake of
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas,
spring semester 1963.
1 The cases discussed in this article are found in 368 P.2d through 377 P.2d No. 4.
" Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958), discussed in Scott, Municipal Penal
Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267 (1958).
3 The penal ordinance of a "statutory" municipality (i.e., one without home rule) is no doubt
also a crime if there is a counterpart state statute or if the ordinance authorizes imprisonment.
4 The power of a "statutory" municipality to enact penal ordinances was later held to be even
more limited than that of a home rule city, in Aurora v. Mitchell, 144 Colo. 526, 357 P.2d 923 (1960),
discussed in Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 38 DICTA 65, 66 (1961).
5 Pueblo v. Clemmer, 375 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1962) (holding that one convicted of a municipal
violation in municipal court on a not-guilty plea, and who involuntarily pays the fine imposed, may
nevertheless thereafter appeal to the county court. The report of the case does not disclose
whether the violation in question was punishable only by fine, or whether imprisonment was
authorized as well.).
6 Id. at 100.
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both qualities; and that with such types the home rule city has
power to enact ordinances if the state has not forbidden the
exercise of this power. 7 A 1961 statutes expressly authorized
Colorado municipalities (both statutory and home rule) to enact
penal ordinances punishing most9 traffic offenses committed within
their municipal borders. As a direct result of these events, the
year 1962 saw a cessation of the sometimes difficult game, played
with gusto in previous years, of pigeon-holing various types of
conduct into the statewide or into the local category. No 1962
case had to deal with the statewide-local distinction.
B. Particular Crimes
1. Murder-Meaning of "Malice."-In one 1962 murder case,",
the trial judge, unfortunately for the cause of justice, took too
literal a view of the word "malice" in the definition of murder. 1
The prosecution's evidence at the trial on a murder charge disclosed that the defendant and the victim, who did not know each
other, got into an argument at a bar, during which the defendant,
after threatening the victim with a gun, shot him to death. The
trial court directed a verdict of acquittal of both murder and manslaughter on the theory that, since the defendant did not know
the deceased, he could not have had "malice" toward him. The
prosecution obtained a review of the case on writ of error, and
the supreme court quite properly disapproved of the trial court's
error in directing a verdict of acquittal, pointing out that "malice"
in the definition of murder is not to be taken literally. 12 It does
not mean hatred, spite or ill-will, for it is clear that one can
murder for love (as in a mercy killing) or for money (as by a
hired killer) as well as for hatred. "Malice" in murder does not
even require an intent to kill, for one can, in Colorado as well as
elsewhere, commit murder by unintentionally killing another
either though highly reckless conduct or in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of some felonies.
2. Murder--"In the Perpetrationof."-In another 1962 murder
case, the prosecution's evidence was that the defendant robbed a
cab driver at gunpoint, ordered him to drive down a lonely road
and stop, conversed with him for a few minutes and shot him to
death. 13 The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder on
the theory that he had killed the deceased in the perpetration of
the robbery. The defendant contended on writ of error that the
killing did not occur "in the perpetration of" the robbery because
it took place some distance away from, and some time after, the
robbery. The supreme court, however, rejected this argument,
7 Woolverton v. City and County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982 (1961) (holding that
a home rule city has power to punish gambling), discussed in Scott, One Year Review of Criminal
Law and Procedure, 39 DICTA 81, 82 (1962).
8 Colo. Sess. Lows 1961, ch. 66, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4-6, -7 (1953), discussed in
Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 39 DICTA 81, 82 (1962).
9 The statute expressly excepts three types of traffic offenses from the exercise of municipal
power: (1) driving under the influence, (2) driving an unregistered car or after license revocation
or suspension, and (3) hit-and-run driving.
10 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
11 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-1 (1953) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought, either express or implied ....
").
12 See infra, notes 148-152 and text, for a discussion of the prosecution's right to retry this
defendant after his erroneous acquittal by the trial court.
13 Bizup v. People, 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962).
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holding that the killing was "so closely connected in point of time,
place and continuity of action" with the robbery as to have been
committed in the perpetration of it. "All of the defendant's acts
from the time he took the money until he cold bloodedly shot his
victim were one continuous integrated attempt to successfully
complete his crime and escape detection.""u This indicates a relatively broad, yet quite proper, view of the scope of those rather
vague words, "in the perpetration of"-an expression which has
been given a narrower interpretation in some jurisdictions.' 5
3. Voluntary Manslaughter.-It may still be the law that an
intentional killing inflicted in a "mutual combat" or "chance medley" constitutes voluntary manslaughter, without regard to the
traditional provocation usually required for this crime. There is
not much modern law on it.' 6 A 1962 Colorado case did not quite
raise the question of the existence of this type of voluntary manslaughter, because the defendant killed only after the mutual
combat had ended.17 Having rendered the victim helpless, the
defendant undertook to kick him in the head numerous times
until he died.
4. Larceny by Bailee.-One who receives stolen property innocently (i.e., not knowing it to be stolen), and who later, after
learning of the stolen character of the property, converts the
property to his own use, cannot, of course, be guilty of the
crime of receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen, for the
receiving and the knowledge must coincide; but he is guilty of
larceny by bailee in Colorado."
5. Larceny from the Person.-Under the Colorado larceny
statute, 9 "larceny from the person" (more familiarly known as
"pickpocketing") is a felony, punishable by imprisonment of from
the penitentiary, regardless of the value of
one to ten years in
20
the property stolen.
6. Forgery.-A 1962 forgery case involved this fact situation:"
X, with an intent to defraud, signed his true name to a check as
14 Id. at 788.
15 E.g., People v. Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382, 125 N.E. 535, 22 A.L.R. 845 (1919).
16 See Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation, 106 U. Pa.L.Rev. 1021, 1031-32
(1958).
17 Trujillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962).
IS Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-2 (6) (1960 Perm, Supp.).
20 People v. McIntosh, 369 P.2d 987 (Colo. 1962) (disapproving trial court's sentence as though
defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor, upon his conviction of larceny from the person
of property worth $26).
21 Gonzales v. People, 369 P.2d 987 (Colo. 1962).
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real company, when in fact he had no
supreme court held this to constitute the
weight of authority in other jurisdictions,
to be forgery,2 although a modern trend,

by statute at least, is to make it so.2 4 On principle, it hardly seems

proper to distinguish between (1) signing another's name to a
check with intent to defraud (forgery) and (2) signing one's own
name to a check as agent for another, without authority to act
as his agent, with intent to defraud (not forgery, by the majority
view).
7. Confidence Game.-A 1962 Colorado case25 holds, without
discussion, that one commits the crime of confidence game, as
well as the crime of forgery, when he tries to pass what he knows
to be a forged check. Elsewhere in this article the propriety of
convicting him, on account of this single act, of both forgery and
confidence game is discussed.2 6 Now, however, the question of his
liability for the crime of confidence game alone is treated.
From the report of the case, it appears that the defendant, with
some confederates, went to a supermarket, made out a check
payable to a person whose driver's license was in the possession
of a lady confederate, and forged a signature. The lady accomplice then unsuccessfully tried to cash the check with the aid of
the driver's license.
One of the difficult areas of Colorado criminal law concerns
the guilt of one who obtains, or attempts to obtain, money or
property by means of a check which "bounces": Is it the shortcheck crime (a misdemeanor), or the no-account-check crime (a
five-year maximum felony), or false pretenses (a ten-year felony
if over $50 obtained), or confidence game (a twenty-year felony) ?27
Earlier Colorado cases have required, in addition to the use of
the bad check, the defendant's worming his way into the victim's
confidence..28 Obtaining his confidence through a course of regular
business dealings

will not do.2 9

It would

seem, for

the same

reason, that the one-shot presentation of a bad check (whether
forged, short or no-account to the victim by a stranger will not do.
And yet that is all that appears in the report of the 1962 case
which upheld the confidence game conviction.
8. Miscellaneous Crimes.-One can carry a deadly weapon
concealed upon his person, in violation of the law, though he
carries it as an article of merchandise and has no in'ention to
use it as a weapon. 3 ) But one who possesses a record of be's on
sporting events, together with a copy of the Daily Racing Form
and a clipping from the newspaper showing the results of horse
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-6-1 (1953) (defining forgery of a check simply as "falsely make, alter,
forge, or counterfeit any . . . check .... . ...
with no specific reference to false statement of
authority to sign).
23 E.g., Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650 (1962); Perkins, Criminal Low, 297 (1957).
24 See A.L.I.Model Penal Code, 83 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
25 Krantz v. People, 374 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1962).
26 See infra notes 113-116 and text thereto.
27 See Scott. One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 36 DICTA 35, 38-39 (1959).
28 E.g., Bevins v. People, 138 Colo. 123, 330 P.2d 709 (1958); see cases cited in Scott, One Year
Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 37 DICTA 45, 48 n.2 3 (1960).
29 Ibid.
30 Pueblo v. Sanders, 376 P.2d 996 (Cola 1962) (municipal ordinance forbids one not a police
officer to "carry concealed upon his person any pistol, bowie knife, dagger or other deadly weapon,"
with no specific mention of any required state of mind.
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races run the previous day, does not keep or exhibit any "device
or apparatus to win or gain
money" within the meaning of the
3 "
Colorado gambling statute.
C. General Principles
1. Parties: Aid and Abet.-Colorado has an unusual statute
punishing (with a misdemeanor penalty) as an "accessory during
the fact" one "who stands by, without giving such help as he may
[have I in his power to prevent a criminal offense from being
committed.1' 32 This passive person is to be distinguished from his
more active counterpart, the aider and abettor-one "who stands
by and aids, abets and assists" and who is subject to the same
punishment as the principal criminal who actually commits the
crime. 13 In a 1962 case, one of Denver's police-burglars of recent
scandalous fame observed a burglary in progress and knew who
the burglars were.3 4 While the burglary continued before his eyes,
he radioed his dispatcher that the building in question had been
burglarized, giving the impression that the crime had ended. The
supreme court held that this conduct, by intentionally misleading
the police, constituted active aid and assistance, making the actor
an aider and abettor in the burglary rather than, as he contended,
a mere accessory during the fact.
2. Self-defense.-The Anglo-American law is quite well settled
that, in order for the defense of self-defense to operate so as to
justify an intentional homicide, the killer must reasonably believe
(though he need not correctly believe) both (1) that his adversary
will, unless prevented, immediately inflict a fatal or serious bodily
injury upon him, and (2) that he must use deadly force against
his adversary in order to prevent him from inflicting such harm.: 5
The Colorado statute on justifiable self-defense, though somewhat
vaguely worded, seems to recognize these principles; 3 6 but a 1960
Colorado case held an instruction to be misleading and confusing
which tells the jury that the right of self-defense in a homicide
case is based upon what a reasonable person would do under
similar circumstances.37

A 1962 case puts Colorado back on the

reasonable-man track, however, approving a given jury instruction that the defendant is entitled to the defense if it appeared
to him and would have appeared to a reasonable man that he
was in imminent danger of being killed or receiving great bodily
harm; and disapproving a tendered instruction that made the
defendant alone the judge of the danger, without regard to the
reasonableness of his judgment. '
31 People v. Wells, 374 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1962), interpreting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40.10-9 (1953).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-1-12, -13 (1953).
33 Id. at § 40-1-12.
34 Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962).
35 In many jurisdictions, including Colorado, if the killer knows that he can safely escape from
what he reasonably believes to be the deadly attack of his adversary by an ignominous retreat,
he is not obliged to take this escape route, but can properly stand his ground and kill his adversary,
provided he was not the aggressor in beginning the difficulty. E.g., Enyort v. People, 67 Colo. 434,
180 Pac. 722 (1919). See Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54, 63 (Colo. 1962) (approving instruction
on self-defense including: "He is not required to retreat.") But if the killer, by striking the first
blow, provoked the deadly attack of his adversary, he is obliged to retreat before using deadly
force upon the adversary. See Perkins, Criminal Law 883-909 (1957).
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-15 (1953).
37 Vigil v. People, 143 Colo. 328, 353 P.2d 82 (1960), criticized in Scott, One Year Review of
Criminal Low and Procedure, 38 DICTA 65, 67-68 (1961).
3S Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1962).
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3. Insanity.-Colorado has by statute adopted the right-andwrong test, supplemented by the irresistible-impulse test, for the
defense of insanityf 9 Under the latter test, one who knows right
from wrong is nevertheless insane if his mental disease renders
him incapable of choosing the right and refraining from doing the
wrong. One problem with the irresistible-impulse test is: how
irresistible does the impulse have to be? According to psychiatrists, complete inability to resist is quite rare. Far more common
are urges which are so strong that most persons could not resist
them under most circumstances, but which they could nevertheless resist if a policeman were standing by.40 Perhaps one can be
held to have an irresistible impulse even if he would not have
followed through his impulse with a police officer looking on.
One 1962 Colorado case, involving a prosecution for murder,
touched upon the problem but did not decide it.41 A defense psychiatrist was asked by the district attorney on cross examination
whether the defendant would have killed the victim if there had
been a policeman at his elbow. The defense made no objection,
and the psychiatrist answered yes. The jury found the defendant
sane and guilty of murder. The supreme court affirmed without
deciding whether the question was proper, i.e., whether one can
be found to have an irrestible impulse which he could have resisted
had there been "a policeman at the elbow."
D. Statutory Changes
The 1962 Colorado legislature discovered a number of criminal
statutes that provided for long terms of imprisonment but which
had failed, apparently through oversight, to state that the imprisonment was to be served in the state penitentiary. Under the Colorado
constitution, 42 such crimes were misdemeanors, for which sentences
of imprisonment must be served in the county jail.43 Thus, burglary with explosives, calling for imprisonment for a minimum
of twenty-five years and a maximum of forty years,44 was a mere
misdemeanor for which the county jail was the required (though
most unsatisfactory) place of imprisonment. The 1962 legislature
in each
corrected several mistakes of this kind, by providing
4
instance for imprisonment in the state penitentiary.

II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure: Amendments
The new C r i m i n a 1 R u 1 e s, promulgated by the Colorado
Supreme Court in 1961 and effective on November 1 of that year,
seem to be working quite well in practice. 46 Only a few cases
39 Colf. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-1(2) (1953).
40 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, 84 (1954): "Most exhibitionists, for example,
have enough control not to yield to their impulse in the presence of a policeman."
41 Bizup v. People, 371 P.2d 786 (Colo, 1962).
42 Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 4.
43 Bustamante v. People, 133 Colo. 497, 297 P.2d 538 (1956).
44 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-3-7 (1953).
45 Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, cc. 46-51, 63, amending the statutes on third-degree rape (that interesting species of rape by which a female may be guilty of rape of a male under 18), burglary
with explosives, insurrection, use of public funds for private purposes, sabotage, anarchy, sedition,
disloyalty, and avoiding a writ of habeas corpus. In some of these statutory amendments the
length of imprisonment, in addition to the place of imprisonment, was changed.
46 See 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. No. 1 (1961) for a symposium on the Rules, containing the text
thereof and extensive commentary thereon.
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concerning the Rules reached the supreme court in 1962, no doubt
in good part because of the newness of the Rules.
One difficulty which has existed during 1962, the first year
under the Rules, has been the overlapping of statutes and rules.
Often the old statute (still on the books) provides for substantially the same procedure as the counterpart Rule, but sometimes
(though far less frequently) the two are absolutely inconsistent.'
Overlapping without inconsistency is bad enough, but inconsistency
is much worse. During 1962, the Colorado Bar Association's Criminal Law Committee, which drafted the Rules, undertook to recommend to the Colorado Legislative Council the specific statutes
which should be repealed or amended because of the Rules. The
1963 Legislative Council has recommended 4to
the 1963 Legislature
8
the adoption of the Committee's suggestions.
Meanwhile, the Committee went to work to draft some recommended amendments to the Rules, in order to cure some defects
which had come to light. The recommendations were, for the
most part, adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court, becoming
effective on January 1, 1963. Most of the amendments do not
effect major changes, but three of them may be singled out for
special mention: (1) Amended Rule 44 authorizes (but does not
require) the district and county courts to appoint counsel to
defend indigent defendants at their trials for misdemeanors.4 9
(2) Amended Rule 46 provides for a new and simple procedure
for enforcing the forfeiture of bail. (3) Amended Rule 35 (b)
allows the defendant to have a review, on writ of error, of the
sentencing court's denial of relief under Colorado's new postconviction remedy (specifically, a motion in the sentencing court to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence).;5o This relief is available
to convicted prisoners whose constitutional rights have been violated under circumstances which precluded correcting the constitutional wrongs by the normal channel of review on writ of error.
B. Pre-Trial Prohibition: Declaratory Judgement
A 1962 Colorado case, following precedent, allows one who has
been once before in jeopardy with respect to a criminal offense
to secure an original writ of prohibition in the supreme court to
prevent a threatened second trial for the same offense. 51 Another
1962 case deals, in an oblique way, with another possible pre-trial
remedy-that of the declaratory judgment to determine the validity
of a criminal statute or penal ordinance.5 2 The Colorado law is
47 See Scott, One Year Review of Crimina! Law and Procedure, 39 DICTA 81, 88 (1962), for a list
of innovations in Colorado criminal procedure made by the Rules.
48 Colorado Legislative Council, Colorado Criminal Low, 148-56 (Research Public. No. 68, Dec.
1962).
49 Colo. R. Crim. P. 44 (1961), as it read before the amendment, required such an appointment
in felony cases, but was silent as to misdemeanor cases.
50 Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (1961), as originally adopted, provided for review on error, on
behalf of the prosecution, of the sentencing court's grant of the motion for post-conviction relief.
51 Menton v. Johns, 377 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1962), following Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128,
330 P.2d 539, 75 A.L.R.2d 628 (1958).
52 Bunzel v. City of Golden, 372 P.2d 161 (Colo. 1962), involved the use of the declaratory
judgment device to question the validity of a municipal ordinance. The supreme court assumed the
device to be proper but held the ordinance to be valid. The case does not make it clear, however,
whether the ordinance in question is a penal ordinance, with criminal penalties authorized for
violations.
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not at all
clear as to whether this remedy is available for such a
53
purpose.
C. Arrest Without Warrant
One 1962 criminal defendant claimed on writ of error that his
arrest without a warrant for robbery was illegal, because the police
officer who arrested him used "hearsay" evidence to determine
reasonable cause. The supreme court properly held 54 that the
policeman's reasonable cause to believe that a robbery had been
committed by the defendant may be based upon what others have
55
told him,

pointing out incidentally that "hearsay" is not the

proper word for information so derived.
D. Bail
The Colorado constitution provides for bail in criminal cases
except for capital offenses "where the proof is evident or the
presumption great. '5 6 In other jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions there is a split of authority as to whether, in
a capital case, a defendant seeking bail has the burden of proving
that the evidence of his guilt is weak, or whether the prosecution
has the burden of proving that it is strong.5 7 In a 1962 Colorado
case the defendant, charged with murder, had been admitted to
bail pending his trial, and was eventually acquitted by the trial
judge's (erroneous) directed verdict of acquittal. 5s The supreme
court, commenting on the bail aspects of the case, stated that, in
view of the bailed person's temptation to abscond in a capital
case, courts should "proceed with extreme caution . . . in the

determination of whether the proof is evident or the presumption
great." 59 Perhaps this is but another way of expressing the view
of some other jurisdictions that the burden of showing that the
evidence is weak rests upon the defendant.
E. Jury List
A criminal defendant charged with a felony in Colorado is by
statute entitled, before arraignment, to be furnished a list of
jurors on the jury panel.60 In a 1962 case the prosecution failed to
provide the defendant with the list, but as he neither objected to
going to trial without it, nor could show how he was prejudiced by
the lack of it, the failure did not constitute reversible error. 61
By a sensible amendment to the Colorado Rules of Criminal
Procedure,2 the jury list is to be furnised at the time of the preat A 1960 case, Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery, 144 Cola. 448, 356 P.2d 884 (1960), discussed
at 38 DICTA 65, 71 (1961), held the declaratory judgment to be a proper device to determine in
advance the validity of a criminal statute. In 1961, Meier v. Schooley, 147 Colo. 244, 363 P.2d
653 (1961), without referring to the 1960 case, held that the declaratory judgment cannot be used
for such a purpose. The 1962 Bunzel case seems to go back to the 1960 view.
54 Brown v. People, 375 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1962) (victim of robbery identified defendant's picture
as the picture of the one who had robbed him). Accord, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959). Of course, even an illegal pretrial arrest cannot be the ground for reversal of a conviction
obtained at a proper trial, the pretrial wrong being of no importance at this point. The legality
of the arrest will be of great importance in the future, however, with respect to the admissibility
of evidence searched for and seized without a search warrant, when the search was made incident
to the arrest.
55 Information from an informr whose past information has proved reliable constitutes probable
cause, though the officer does not know his identity. People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal.2d 330, 341 P.2d 1
(1959).
56 Colo. Const. art. II, § 19.
57 Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, 108 (1947).
58 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
59 Id. at 430.
60 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-3-6 (1953).
61 Goldsberry v. People, 369 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1962).
62 Colo. R. Crim. P. 10(f) (1963 amend.).
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paration of the list of jurors who will form the panel for the
defendant's case, rather than furnished at some time before arraignment when the jurors on the list will generally not be the jurors
who will try the case.
F. Information
An information charging burglary is not improperly worded if
it states that the defendant feloniously and without force entered
"the room of Leo Beaubien at the Harvard Hotel, viz., room 204,"
with intent to commit larceny therein, even though Leo was a
one-night guest at the hotel 6and not the owner or even a permanent resident of the building. '
An old Colorado statute, and a new Colorado Rule,6 4 provides
for indorsement of prosecution witnesses upon the information at
the time of filing it, with a provision that the names of witnesses
not so indorsed, whose identities are not learned by the prosecuting
attorney until afterwards, may be later indorsed and the witnesses
called to testify at the trial. A 1962 case concerned the trial court's
granting of a motion by the prosecution to indorse two new names.
The defendant objected to the motion, but, as he did not ask for a
continuance on account of surprise, the supreme court held that
the trial court did not commit reversible
error in allowing the
indorsement on the day of the trial.6 5
63 Gallegos v. People, 370 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1962).
64 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-4-1, -2 (1953); Colo. R. Crim. P. 7(b)(1)
65 Goldsberry v. People, supro, note 61.
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G. Plea
Whether a Colorado defendant, once he has pleaded guilty to a
criminal charge, may thereafter, before he is sentenced, be allowed
to change his plea to not guilty is said to be a matter lying within
the sound discretion of the trial court. 66 In this case the defendant,
charged with burglary, pleaded guilty when unrepresented by
counsel, persisting therein after having been warned by the court
of the consequences of his guilty plea.6 7 Before the time set for
sentence he acquired counsel, 68 who, after advising the defendant
to change his plea to not guilty, moved the court for permission to
withdraw the guilty plea. It would seem that, in the case of a
guilty plea made without counsel, if counsel later, but before
sentencing, undertakes to represent the defendant and, after study,
believes that the defendant has a chance of success on a not-guilty
plea, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to grant a change of
plea upon motion made before sentencing. rn any event, it is
hard to reconcile the holding of the case with the magnanimous
statement of the Colorado Supreme Court on other occasions to
the effect that the discretion to allow a change of plea "should be
exercised liberally in favor of life and liberty." 69
H. Pre-Trial Discovery
Pre-trial discovery in criminal cases, to a limited extent, arrived
in Colorado with the adoption in 1961 of the new Rules of Criminal
Procedure. One Colorado trial judge in 1962 invented a novel type
of pre-trial discovery device when he ordered that the prosecution
witnesses talk to the defendant's attorney on pain of being disqualified as witnesses if they should refuse. The supreme court,
however, threw cold water on this new method of forcing prosecution witnesses to talk to the defense attorney, holding that the
trial court has no power to disqualify witnesses for such a reason.70
Doubtless, however, the trial court could properly order the district
attorney not to interfere with the defense attorney's attempts to
interview government witnesses, holding the threat of contempt
over the district attorney's head to enforce obedience to the order.
I. Voir Dire
In two 1962 cases the defendant, after his conviction, argued
on writ of error that events which occurred at the voir dire necessitated a new trial. In one case a prospective juror, in answer to
a question asked by the attorney for a co-defendant, stated that
she was a "little prejudiced" against people of Spanish-American
ancestry because several
boys of that type had broken some win71
dows at her church.
Upon challenge for cause, she was excused. The defendant's motion for a mistrial, on the ground that the juror's statement had poisoned the minds of the other prospective jurors, was denied; and the
66 Hudspeth v. People, 375 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1962) (trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
change plea upheld).
67 However, he did consult with his co-defendant's counsel after the prosecution presented evidence
in aggravation. After this consultation defendant said he had nothing to say as to why judgment
and sentence should not be pronounced.
68 The acquisition of counsel appears in the record of the case but not in the report.
69 See Gearhart v. People, 113 Colo. 9, 11, 154 P.2d 47 (1944); Abshier v. People, 87 Colo. 507,
524, 289 Pac. 1081, 1088 (1930).
70 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
71 Cruz v. People, 368 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1962).
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supreme court held the denial to be proper, since her quiet statement was by no means an emotional outburst of an inflammatory
nature. In the other case, the defendant challenged for cause all
prospective jurors who had stated on voir dire that they would
regard the defendant's failure to take the witness stand as some
evidence of guilt. 7 ' The trial court then told the jurors in strong
language that the law required that they must not so regard the
defendant's failure and asked them if they would follow the law
in this matter. On their assurance that they would, the court
denied the challenge, and the supreme court upheld its action.
J. "Exclusion Rule"
The trial court often orders that the witnesses in a criminal
case stay out of the courtroom during the trial except when testifying, the purpose of this "exclusion rule" being to prevent the
witnesses from taking their cues from one another. In the Cruz
case,73 the trial court made such an order, adding that the witnesses
should not talk to each other but might talk to the district attorney's office. Thereafter, the district attorney interviewed several
witnesses in a group at one conference. The defendant, on learning
of this, moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The
supreme court affirmed the defendant's conviction, saying that
the particular exclusion order did not expressly forbid such an
interview and that, in any event, a mistrial is not the proper
remedy for a violation of the exclusion rule. The court stated
that an intentional violation of the exclusion rule might lead the
trial court to disqualify the offending witness, although even here
the court has discretion whether or not to impose this penalty.
A second 1962 case concerning the exclusion rule points out
that the trial court, after putting witnesses under the rule, has
discretion to permit a witness (here a police officer) to remain in
the courtroom
after testifying in order to consult with the district
74
attorney.
K. Variance
An informaion charged that the defendant robbed the victim of
his money and his watch. The prosecution's proof at the trial was
that the defendant robbed the victim of his watch, but there was
no proof as to the money. The defendant's claim that this constituted a fatal variance was properly rejected by the supreme court,
which pointed out that in 75robbery the kind of property taken
and its value are immaterial.
L. Insanity Trial
Colorado legislation provides for the alternative of two separate
trials or one single trial, in the trial court's discretion, whenever a
defendant has pleaded both "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason
of insanity. '7 6 The supreme court has explained the reason for
72 Goldsberry v. People, supra, note 61.
73 Supra, note 71.
74 Edwards v. People, 377 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1962).
75 Sterling v. People, 376 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1962).
76 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-3 (Supp. 1960). Though this statute as amended in 1955 is not clearly
worded, apparently the trial court has discretion, in the case of separate trials, as to whether to
have the same or a different jury try the two separate issues. A different jury is the more usual
procedure. E.g., Trujillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962); Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322
P.2d 674 (1958).
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allowing separate trials before separate juries.7 7 Since, on the
issue of insanity, a much wider inquiry into the defendant's
behavior (including his other crimes and other misconduct) is
permitted than is allowable on the issue of guilt, a separate trial
before a separate jury protects the defendant from prejudice on
the issue of guilt, which might arise in the minds of a jury trying
both issues.
M. Miscellaneous Minor Matters at the Trial
1. Unauthorized Communications.-One 1962 case involved a
brief out-of-court communication between a juror and the manager
of the store which defendant was charged with burglarizing.78 During a recess in the trial, the manager was seen talking to the juror.
This was reported to the trial judge, who, after calling the juror
in t o chambers to find out what was said, learned that the two had
not discussed the case in any way. The trial judge's refusal to take
further action (such as granting a mistrial) was upheld by the supreme court, on the ground that the defendant showed no prejudice
resulting from the unauthorized communication.
2. Defendant in Handcuffs.-It is wrong to exhibit a defendant
to the jury in handcuffs or legs irons, or dressed in a striped suit
with "County Jail" written across the back.7 9 But where one juror
by accident saw the defendant in handcuffs as he was being brought
to the court house for the trial, the defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied. The supreme court properly upheld the denial of
the motion.80
3. Closing Argument.-In one case, the district attorney, in his
closing argument, inadvertently referred to the defendant's other
crimes (i.e., crimes for which he was not on trial), properly in evidence, as "other offenses" rather than using the preferable term
"o'her transactions."' The defendant's motion for a mistrial was
held to have been properly denied in view of the trial court's
prompt admonition to the jury to disregard the use of "offenses"
because the defendant had not been charged with or proved guilty
of the other transactions in question. In another case, the supreme
court spoke of the trial court's broad discretion as to the scope of
the district attorney's (and defense attorney's) comment upon the2
evidence and the legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Counsel may not misstate the facts in evidence, but he has a good
deal of freedom in the inferences he urges the jury to draw from
the facts.
N. Motion to Elect Between Counts
In a 1962 case the defendant, who had been arrested with stolen
property in his possession, had received it from the thief either (1)
knowing, at the time he received it, that it had been stolen or (2)
not knowing it then but later, after learning of it, converting it to
77 Trujillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962).
78 Torres v. People, 369 P.2d 80 (Colo. 19621, (the manager spoke to the juror these mysterious
words: "It's amazing how they can do some of it," to which the juror replied, "Yes, it is.").
79 Montoya v. People, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959) (handcuffs; recognizing the possibility
of the necessity of handcuffs for dangerous defendants); Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 174 P.2d
717 (1946) (striped clothing marked 'County Jail").
90 Ruark v. People, 372 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1962).
81 Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962).
82 Bizup v. People, 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962).
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his own use."3 Under the former alternative, his crime was receiving
stolen property; under the latter, larceny by bailee. The district attorney, not being able to show exactly what was in the defendant's
mind at the moment he received the property, prepared an information charging the defendant in the alternative in two counts. After
the prosecution's evidence was in, the defendant moved to make the
district attorney elect one of the two counts to submit to the jury.
The trial court denied the motion, and the case was submitted to
the jury with instructions to convict on only one count according
to its findings of fact concerning the defendant's mental state when
he received the property. The supreme court a f firm ed the
defendant's conviction of larceny by bailee, holding that, with
evidence both ways the trial court properly refused to require
the prosecution to elect between the two counts.
0. Evidence
A number of Colorado criminal cases decided in 1962 necessarily
involved problems of evidence, but, since matters of evidence will
be treated in a separate article, only a few cases which relate particularly to criminal law are specifically discussed herein.
1. Burden of Proof.-The Colorado legislation on murder contains a provisions 4 that once the prosecution has proved the defendant killed the victim, s the defendant has the burden of proving
circumstances which mitigate the homicide to voluntary manslaughter (i.e., proof that the killing was in a heat of passion induced by
an adequate provocation) or which reduce it all the way down to no
crime (e.g., proof that the killing was in proper self-defense). The
supreme court in 1962 held that this statute places upon the defendant whose defense is self-defense the burden of going forward
with some evidence of self-defense, but that, once he has done so,
the burden of persuasion still remains with the prosecution, and
that the measure of its persuasion is still proof beyond reasonable
as to any matter which condoubt.86 This is the way it should be
7
cerns the issue of guilt or innocence.
2. Confessions.-If one (named A) of two confederates confesses to a crime implicating the other (B), and B was not present
when A confessed and never thereafter assented thereto, the confession is not admissible in evidence against B because, as to him,
it is plain hearsay.8 - In a 1962 felony-murder case the prosecution's
theory in the prosecution of B was that B, an adult, was the accessory before the fact who procured A, a 15-year-old boy, to rob and
kill the victim.st The trial court admitted A's confession, with all
83 Peters v. People, Supra, note 81.
84 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-20 (1953).
85 Although the statute is not clearly worded ("The killing being proved"), this probably
requires proof that the defendant intentionally killed the victim (which intention may be inferred
from his intentional use of a deadly weapon upon the victim).
86 Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1962).
87 The some thing applies to the issue of insanity as a defense. In the first instance the prosecution
need not prove sanity, but once the defendant puts in some evidence of insanity, the prosecution
has the burden of persuasion of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Shank v. People, 79 Colo. 576,
247 Pac. 559 (1926). Compare the situation where the defendant's defense is procedural, such as
the statute of limitations. Here, if there is a dispute of fact (e.g., whether the defendant
in fact fled from justice so as to toll the statute), the law might properly put the burden of
persuasion (by a preponderance) upon the defendant. This issue is not concerned with guilt or
innocence, for the statute of limitations, if applicable, does not negative guilt.
S8 If A and B are tried together and A's confession introduced into evidence, this means that
the reference in A's confession to B must be deleted, or that the jury be instructed to consider
the confession as to A's guilt but not B's.
S9 Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1962).
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its references to B's conduct in procuring A, on the theory that, to
convict B as an accessory, it was necessary first to prove that his
agent A actually did the robbing and killing. The supreme court
reversed B's conviction of murder for the trial court's error in allowing A's full confession. It was proper to use it at B's trial to show
A's conduct as the principal, but all references to B's conduct as an
accessory must be deleted.
The same case involved another interesting confession problem.
Upon the arrest of the defendant, the prosecution employed a psychiatrist to make a mental examination of the defendant in jailjust in case the defendant should later plead not guilty by reason
of insanity.1 0 (He did not so plead, as it turned out). During the
doctor's mental examination, the defendant orally confessed to the
crime in question and at the defendant's trial the doctor testified
to the defendant's confession, but (there being no issue as to insanity) not as to the defendant's mental condition. The supreme
court reversed the conviction, holding that, aithough it might have
been proper for the doctor to make the mental examination, it was
reversible error to allow him to testify as to the confession he heard
during the examination. This result is doubtless required by the
special Colorado statute on procedure in insanity cases. 91 In other
jurisdictions, however, the defendant's confession made to a psychiatrist may be admissible unless the psychiatrist has "coerced"
92
the defendant into giving it.
There were two other 1962 confession cases. In one it was held
that the Colorado procedure by which the trial court determined
the admissibility of a confession by hearing evidence, in the jury's
presence, of its accuracy is not error because of what the jury
heard, even though the trial court, finding the confession to be inaccurately transcribed, refused to allow it in evidence.9 3 The jury
did not hear the wording of the excluded confession, although they
may have received the impression, from what they did hear, that
90 A procedure held legal in Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 352 P.2d 112 (1960), noted at
38 DICTA 78-79 (19611.
91 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-2 (1953 (in o mental examination of a defendant, who has pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity, made by psychiatrists of one of two state hospitals or by a
commission of psychiatrists appointed by the court, "no substantive evidence acquired directly
or indirectly for the first time as the result of such observation and examination shall be
admissible on the issue of guilt of the crime charged ..
.. ) If this is the rule as to the regular
type of examination after plea, it should not be circumvented by the irregular type of examination
in jail before plea.
92 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), involved the state prosecution's use of a psychiatrist,
not to make a mental examination, but to get a confession. By pretending to be trying to help
the defendant, the psychiatrist got the defendant to confess - a confession overheard by the
police who were eavesdropping. The confession was held to be coerced, and its use by a state
in evidence held to violate fourteenth amendment due process.
93 Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962).
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the defendant had made damaging admissions. In still another confession case, the court held that when the defendant's voluntary
confession is admissible, it may be received in all its parts including
the defendant's reference therein to other misconduct (here, his acts
of fornication, unrelated to the crime charged)."
In 1962 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Colorado
murder conviction of a 14-year-old boy because it found that his
confession, used in evidence against him at his trial, had been coerced by methods condemned by the due process clause of the United
States Constitution's fourteenth amendment. 5 The boy had orally
and voluntarily confessed immediately upon his arrest, and five
days later he signed a formal written confession. This latter confession was obtained before the boy had been brought before the
juvenile judge and after he had been held in Juvenile Hall for five
days without seeing a lawyer, parent or other friendly adult, although his mother had made one attempt to see him. On the other
hand, the boy was not threatened or beaten or subjected to any sort
of relentless interrogation; he was not placed in solitary confinement; and he was told he did not have to make a statement and that
he could have an attorney and his parents present. The Court held
(in a 4-to-3 decision) that, on the above uncontroverted evidence
concerning the events surrounding the written confession, the written confession was coerced; and that the conviction must be reversed even though, at the trial, the defendant's uncoerced oral confession, together with other evidence, a d e q u a t e 1 y proved the
defendant's guilt. No doubt the defendant's extreme youth was
important to the majority's determination of coercion, because,
except for that one factor, his treatment by the authorities does
not seem to have been coercive.
3. Disqualification of Witnesses.-One case96 suggests that the
trial court may, in its discretion, disqualify a witness who has intentionally violated the courts exclusion rule; 97 another 98 that it
may not, as a method of enforcing a pre-trial discovery order (here
a novel one which orders the prosecution witnesses to discuss the
case with the defendant's attorney), disqualify a witness who fails
to obey the order.
4. Miscellaneous.-Casesinvolving evidence obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures-which evidence, the United States
Supreme Court held in Mapp v. Ohio,"' a state must not use against
a s'ate criminal defendant-have as yet hardly begun to appear in
the Colorado Supreme Court reports. 10 0 As usual, however, a number of 1962 cases dealt with the admissibility of evidence of the defendant's other crimes.10 1 Other cases denied the relevance-in a
94 Torres v. People, 369 P.2d (Colo. 1962).
95 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), reversing Gallegos v. People, 145 Colo. 53,
358 P. 2d 1028 (1960), discussed briefly at 38 DICTA 65, 78 (1961).
96 Cruz v. People, 368 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1962).
97 See supro notes 73-74 and text.
98 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962), discussed supra at note 70 and text.
119 367 U.S. 643 (1961), noted at 39 DICTA 94 (1962).
100 Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962), held a search (without a search warrant)
and seizure to be reasonable in view of the permission given (by whom is not stated) to the
police to make the search. The court did not need to decide upon the retroactivity of the case
of Mapp v. Ohio. For a recent federal case holding that the Mapp case applies retroactively and
can be taken advantage of, in a federal habeas corpus case, by a state convict who, before
Mapp, failed to object at the trial and failed to raise the point on his appeal, see Hall v. Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963).
101 Ruark v. People, 372 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1962); Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962);
Jordan v. People, 376 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1962); Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962).
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homicide prosecution where the defendant's defense was self-de-

fense-of the victim's uncommunicated threats; 10' 2 refused to require
positive identification by eyewitnesses to a robbery, in view of other

evidence of guilt; 10 3 allowed a witness to read notes he had made
at the time of an event to which he is testifying, on the theory that
the notes are his "past recollection recorded," although the witness
did not first try to use the notes to refresh his present recollection; 10 4 upheld the admissibility, in a homicide case, of a photograph
of the deceased, though it brought vividly to the jurors' attention

the details of a shocking crime; 0 5 allowed evidence of flight as
showing consciousness of guilt, although the defendant, after the
crime, slept before fleeing; 106 and permitted a finding of guilt to

rest upon circumstantial evidence alone. 1

7

In a case where a con-

federate of the defendant, called by the prosecution to testify
against him, refused to testify on the ground of his privilege against
self-incrimination, the district attorney's act of calling the witness
was not misconduct, in view of the fact that he fully expected the

witness to give testimony.1 08

P. Instructions
Several 1962 cases dealt with the effect upon a criminal con-

viction of improper jury instructions. It is, of course, error for the
court to give an instruction on the law (even one which states the

law correctly) if there is no proof on which to base the instruction.01 9 But is it reversible error to do so?

In one 1962 case the defendant was charged with murder, but
at the trial there was no proof of any homicide greater than man-

slaughter. 110 The court, over the defendant's objections, instructed
on murder as well as on manslaughter, and the jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. It was argued on writ of error that,
although it was error to instruct on murder without any support in
the evidence, the defendant was not harmed thereby, because the

jury rejected the murder verdict and found him guilty of manslaughter, for which there was evidentiary support. The supreme
court reversed, however, on the theory that, since verdicts are often

compromises between possible choices, the murder possibility enhanced the chance of a manslaughter conviction. Thus the defendant was in fact prejudiced by an instruction on a higher degree of
crime than the proof warranted."'
102 Truiillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962) (Newly discovered evidence of threats not
grounds for a new trial).
103 Gurule v. People, 372 P.2d 88 (Colo. 1962). See also People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo.
1962) (Identification witness testified, "I am not sure but I think I recognize him," meaning the
defendant).
104 Jordan v. People, 376 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1962), following 3 Wigmore Evidence, §738 (3d ed. 1940).
(3d ed. 1940).
105 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
106 Goldsberry v. People, 369 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1962).
107 Edwards v. People, 377 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1962).
108 Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962), distinguishing De Guesoldo v. People, 147
Colo. 462, 364 P.2d 374 (1961)
(prosecution did not expect confederate to testify, but did
expect him to claim the privilege), noted at 39 DICTA 92 (1962).
109 Conversely, it is proper to refuse to give an instruction where there is no evidence on
which to base it. Sterling v. People, 376 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1962).
110 Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1962).
111 It might similarly be argued that for the prosecution to qualify the jury for the death
penalty when there is no possibility of imposing capital punishment (or when the prosecution
does not intend to ask for it) is prejudicial error, for may not the jury be more likely to
compromise on conviction of a higher degree of homicide on account of the suggestion of
capital punishment?
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In another 1962 case, involving a prosecution for involuntary
manslaughter, there was proof that the defendant, driving his car,
hit and killed another person.' 1 2 There was some evidence that he
was driving with criminal negligence, but there was no evidence
that he was violating any speeding statute. The trial court instructed the jury to convict if it should find either (1) that he was
criminally negligent and that this negligence was the proximate
cause of the victim's death, or (2) that he was speeding in violation
of law and that speeding was the proximate cause of the victim's
death. The supreme court reversed the conviction of involuntary
manslaughter because of the giving of instructions (containing correct statements of law) not supported by evidence and because "the
jury might well have considered such instructions as an invitation
to proceed on the law without evidence"-i.e., to find that the defendant was speeding when there was no evidence of that fact. This
error is more clearly a reversible one than the error in the case discussed in the next paragraph above. Here the jury found him guilty
of the crime instructed on (manslaughter) because they found that
he was speeding, but that he did not drive with criminal negligence;
whereas in the previous case the jury found that he did not commit
the crime on which instructions were given (murder).
One 1962 case points out that it is sometimes reversible error
to instruct the jury in the exact language of the statute-as where
the statute is so ambiguously worded as to tend to confuse the
jury.""x Here the statute in question provides that, once the prosecution has proved that the defendant killed the victim, "the burden
of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the
homicide, will devolve on the accused." The quoted portion has been
construed to mean that the defendant has the burden of going forward with the evidence, but that he does not have the burden of
persuasion; 114 however, one could never in the world learn this from
simply reading the statute. This statute, then, must be more than
merely read to the jury; it must be explained.
Q. Verdict
1. Number of Crimes.-In one 1962 case the defendant, acting
in concert with a confederate, forged a check, and the confederate
unsuccessfully attempted to pass it."' The defendant was charged
with four separate crimes arising out of the one transaction: (1)
confidence game," 6 (2) conspiracy to commit confidence game, (3)
forgery, and (4) conspiracy to commit forgery. He was convicted
on all four counts and sentenced to a term of imprisonment on each
count (the report failing to state whether the sentences were to be
served consecutively or concurrently. The supreme court affirmed
the conviction without specifically discussing whether it was proper
to make four separate crimes out of what might seem to be but one.
It is quite well settled that one who agrees with another to commit
a crime and who then goes ahead and commits it may be convicted
of both the conspiracy and the substantive crime, and sentenced
112 Rumley v.

People, 368 P.2d 197 (Colo.

1962).

113 Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1962).
114 Ibid., construing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-20 (1953).
115 Krontz v. People, 374 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1962).
116 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10-1 (1953) provides for a one to twenty year term of imprisonment
for one who obtains, or attempts to obtain, any money or property from another by means of a
confidence game.
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consecutively for each. 117 It is not so clear, however, that one who
forges an instrument and later utters it can properly be convicted
of (and receive separate consecutive sentences for) both forgery
and confidence game. Under the Colorado statute,"" one who forges
a document and then utters it cannot be guilty of two separate acts
of forgery. The statute plainly says that one who utters a forged
instrument is guilty of forgery, so that uttering is simply one way
of committing forgery. 119 (On similar principles, one who has forcible sexual relations with a sixteen-year-old mentally defective girl
is guilty of one rape, not three, though he has committed his one
rape in three different ways.) 120 If the legislature does not intend to
impose two forgery penalties upon one who first forges and then
utters, it is hard to believe that it could have intended a forgery
2
penalty plus a confidence game penalty for the same conduct.1' '
2. Consistency.-In a 1962 conspiracy case, four persons-A, B,
C and D - were tried together for an alleged conspiracy with one
another to steal. 122 A, B and C were acquitted, but D was found
guilty. On writ of error the supreme court reversed the conviction
and ordered D's discharge, for the "incongruous conclusion" that D
conspired with A, B and C, although they did not conspire with
him.123 In another 1962 case the defendant was charged in two
counts with burglary and larceny, on the theory that he first entered into another's hotel room with intent to steal and that he then
stole. 124 The jury convicted him of the burglary, but it was not able
to agree upon the larceny; so the district attorney's motion to dismiss the larceny charge was granted. On writ of error the defendant
125
urged that the verdict of conviction of burglary was inconsistent
117 E.g. Callahan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). Contra: Model Penal Code, § 1.07(1)(b),
forbidding two convictions when 'one offense consists only of a conspiracy to commit the other."
118 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-6-1 (1953).
119 Davenport v. People, 138 Colo. 291, 332 P.2d 485 (1959) (evidence of uttering supports
conviction of forgery).
120 E.g., People v. Craig, 17 Cal.2d 453, 110 P.2d 403 (1951) (one act of forcible intercourse
with 16-year-old girl is one offense, not two).
121 In dealing with the counterpart situation with respect to federal crimes, the United States
Supreme Court has sometimes held that Congress did not mean to make two separate crimes
out of what is really one transaction. Thus, where the defendant entered a federally-insured
bank with intent to rob, and then robbed, he could not properly be convicted of both burglary
and robbery; the former merges into the latter. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
122 Archuleta v. People, 368 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1962).
123 Accord: Commonwealth v. Avrach, 110 Pa. Super. 438, 168 Atl. 531 (1933) (joint trial of A
and B, alleged conspirators; A convicted, B acquitted). Cf. People v. Levy, 299 III. App. 453, 20 N.E.
2d 171 (1939) (A tried in a separate trial for conspiracy with B and convicted; judgment reversed.
A to be held in custody or under bond, to be convicted if B is convicted, and to be acquitted if
B is acquitted, at B's later trial).
124 Gallegos v. People, 370 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1962).
125 As to the extent to which verdicts must be consistent, see 2 King, Colorado Practice
Methods, § 2377 (1956).
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with the acquittal of larceny, but the supreme court, affirming the
conviction, properly held that the verdicts were not in fact inconsistent. One may enter a place with intent to steal (and thus commit
burglary) and then, once inside, fail to commit larceny-perhaps
because he can find nothing worth stealing, or because he is frightened away before he can lay hands on something worth taking, or
even because, overcome with remorse, he changes his mind about
stealing.
R. Motion for New Trial
A 1962 case states that a motion for a new trial on account of
newly discovered evidence is to be regarded with disfavor, and that
the trial court's discretion in acting on the motion is not (ordinarily,
at least) to be disturbed on writ of error by the supreme court.1r2
It is true that there are fairly stringent rules about the kind of new
evidence which will warrant a new trial. The evidence must be
newly-discovered, not merely cumulative, not available at the trial,
and, if known then, might well have led to a different result. It
seems wrong, in view of these orthodox limitations, to add what
appears to be an invitation to trial courts to deny such a motion
even when the new evidence satisfies the requirements.
S. Sentence
1. Conviction on Two Counts.-One who has been convicted of
both burglary and conspiracy to commit that burglary may be sentenced consecutively for each crime, 127 although often the trial court
in its discretion imposes concurrent sentences, as it may do whenever a defendant is convicted of two or more counts in a multiplecount information. Where the trial court gave a single sentence
without designating which of two convictions the sentence applied
to, it was held not to be reversible error warranting a new trial or
a new sentence, so long as the sentence imposed did not exceed that
28
which could have been given for either of the two convictions.'
2. Collection of Fine.-A municipal ordinance provides for enforcing the collection of a fine imposed by the municipal court upon
a defendant, by throwing the defendant, who fails to pay it on demand, into the city jail until he pays. The supreme court upheld the
district court's release of a defendant who had been thus confined
2
without the required demand having first been made upon him.'
3. Service of Sentence.-In figuring the service of a sentence
of imprisonment, time spent by the prisoner on parole and while an
escapee does not count.1 3 Only a desperate prisoner, clutching at
straws, could argue otherwise.
4. Juvenile Delinquency Sentence.-The county court, in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding, was not authorized to sentence
the child to a term of imprisonment in the county jail .1 3 1 One may
wonder how the court could have thought the juvenile was going
to get, in the county jail, the care approximating that given by his
126 See Edwards v. People, 377 P.2d 399, 404 (Colo. 1962).
127 Supro, note 117.
12S Vigil v. People, 375 P.2d 103 (Colo. 1962).
129 Application of Montez, 370 P.2d 154 (Colo. 1962).
130 Furlow v. Tinsley, 377 P.2d 132 (Colo. 1962).
131 Martinez v. People, 372 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1962). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-1 (1953), before its
amendment in 1960, did provide for a possible county jail term for juvenile delinquents over 14.
The amendment deleted this provision.
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parents, or how he was going to be treated there as "misdirected
and misguided, and needing aid, encouragement, help and assistance"1 32 unless it be a most unusual county jail.
T. Appeal from Municipal or Justice Court
Two 1962 cases concerned the right of a defendant, convicted of
municipal or county court, to appeal after having paid the fine
imposed upon him. The first case held that one who involuntarily
pays the fine imposed by the municipal court can still appeal to the
county (in Denver, the superior) court. 13 The second case held
that, even where the fine is paid voluntarily, the 4 defendant (convicted in this case in justice court) may appeal.'1
The latter case also held that one is not precluded from
appealing by his failure to identify, in his notice of appeal, the
crime of which he was convicted. Although the statute on appeals
requires this identification, the supreme court, labeling the requirement highly technical, found that the appellant's failure to identify
the crime did not prejudice the prosecution, which knew exactly
what the offense was.
Another 1962 case allows one who has pleaded guilty in municipal court to appeal to the county (superior) court, where he will
get a trial de novo. 13 5 In an analogous situation, a Colorado statute very clearly gives this privilege to one who has pleaded
guilty in the justice of the peace court.13 6
U. Review on Writ of Error
1. Confession of Error.-In two cases the Attorney General
confessed error before the Colorado Supreme Court, in the tradiof the United States
tion of the office of the Solicitor General
137
before the United States Supreme Court.
2. Reversible Error.-One case explained at some length that,
even when the guilt of the convicted defendant is indicated by
the record, serious trial errors of a prejudicial nature warrant a
remand for a new trial. 138 The supreme court apparently believed
this defendant's guilt to be clearly shown by the record; but, so
as not to prejudice his chances for a fair trial on remand, it properly
expressed this notion in the more cautious language of "indicated"
guilt.
Another case held that one who is convicted of two crimes
when the proof shows he could have committed but one (as where
one is charged with embezzlement and larceny of the same property at the same time and place, the district attorney not knowing
which of the two crimes the evidence will prove), a conviction of
132 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-13 (1953).
133 Pueblo v. Clemmer, 375 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1962). distinguishing Scott v. Denver, 125 Colo. 68,
241 P.2d 857 (1952) (no appeal if fine paid voluntarily).
134 Jackson v. People, 376 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1962), overruling Scott v. Denver, supro note 133.
135 Pueblo v. Trujillo, 374 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1962), following the weight of authority, see Annot.,
42 A.L.R.2d 995 (1955).
136 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 79-13-2 (Supp. 1960).
137 McCray v. People, 371 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1962) (confession that evidence does not support
verdict of conviction); Martinez v. People, 372 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1962) (confession that sentence
was to an improper place of confinement).
138 Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1962). On this principle the United States Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), on account
of the state's use of the defendant's coerced written confession, even though this confession
merely repeated the defendant's earlier voluntary oral confession, which was properly used in
evidence. If a serious error like the use of a coerced confession is mode, the United States.
Supreme Court will reverse, without considering whether the error is not prejudicial in view of
other strong evidence of guilt.
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both crimes is not reversible if the trial court sentences the defendant concurrently, the sentence being less than the maximum
139 which
could have been imposed for the lesser of the two crimes.
3. Verdict "Contrary to Law and Evidence."-It seems that
everyone who seeks review of his criminal case on writ of error
complains vaguely (in his motion for a new trial and in his brief;
and formerly in his assignments of error, now abolished) that the
verdict of guilt is "contrary to the law and the evidence." The
supreme court in 1962 reiterated an earlier statement that "Such a
general allegation is defective as to form, and such assignment
being improperly presented ordinarily need not be considered on
its merits.' 14 1 It seems clear that the defendant who complains
about the trial court's application of the law to his case should
point out the specific error-whether it be in its rulings on the
evidence, or in refusing to declare a mistrial, or in giving or refusing instructions, or whatever it may be-of which he complains.
Where the complaint is about the evidence, he should specifically
claim that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a requested
judgment of acquittal, or in denying a motion for new trial because
the verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence, or
(under Rule 29(b) of the new Rules) in denying the defendant's
post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal in accordance with
his earlier motion for a judgment of acquittal, 141 as may be appropriate in the particular case.
4. Review by Certiorari.-Rule106 (a) (4) of the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure allows a higher court to vacate the judgment
of an inferior court which has "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused
its discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy."
In one 1962 case, the supreme court, in an original proceeding in
that court, vacated the judgment of a district court which had
summarily found the district attorney in contempt and fined him
$25 for failing to be present or represented by his deputy when a
criminal case was called. 142 The supreme court found that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed summarily, for the
131) Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962). Query, however, whether this should be so
if the two crimes carry different maximum penalties. It could be argued that the trial court might
have sentenced him more severely with the greater crime in mind, although the jury might have
acquitted him of that crime if it had done its duty and convicted him of one and acquitted him
of the other.
140 See Cruz v. People, 368 P.2d 774, 775 (Colo. 1962).
The supreme court goes on to
consider whether the evidence supports the verdict.
141 Perhaps this post-verdict motion may be termed, a little loosely, a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or judgment n.o.v.-os the counterpart motion in civil procedure is
generally called.
142 District Attorney v. District Court, 371 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1962).
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contempt, if any, did not occur wholly in the court's presence. As
to the use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari 14 3 in lieu of
of the ordinary remedy of writ of error, it may be noted that the
supreme court apparently uses the word "jurisdiction" here in a
rather broad (if somewhat vague) sense; 144 and that it finds the
writ of error to be an inadequate remedy in a situation when it
ought to be adequate to do justice, especially when the situation
involves a mere monetary fine. 145 Perhaps the trouble lies in the
vague state of the Colorado procedural law in cases of criminal
contempt. 146 The law ought to be that one fined for contempt can
pay his fine (to save himself from going to jail) and yet apply to
the supreme court for a review of the trial court's action in finding
him guilty of contempt.
V. Parole Violation
One 1962 case ordered the release of a parolee who had been
arrested for suspected parole violation and kept in confinement,
pending the parole department's investigation of the violation, for147a
period longer than the fifteen-day period specified by the statute.
W. Former Jeopardy
In 1962, two cases before the Colorado Supreme Court involved
the question of whether the state constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy f o r b i d s the retrial of a criminal defendant
acquitted by a directed verdict of the trial court, which erroneously
held that the prosecution's evidence, assuming it to be true, did
not prove that the defendant committed the crime charged. 14 In
one, the trial court directed a verdict of acquittal of both murder
and manslaughter where the prosecution's p r o o f was that the
defendant shot the victim to death in cold blood, the reason for
this startling action being that the defendant did not know the
victim and so could not have acted with malice toward him.1 49 In
the other, the trial court directed a verdict of acquittal in a case
involving assault to rob and conspiracy to rob, on the erroneous
ground that the prosecution had not proved venue.' 5" Later, the
trial court, recognizing its mistake, ordered a new trial. In each
case, does a retrial constitute double jeopardy?
This is doubtless the way most American jurisdictions would
interpret their double-jeopardy provisions; 15 1 but it is arguable
1 6

143 Under Colo. R. Civ. P. 106 the writ of that name is abolished, but Rule 0 (a)(4) keeps alive
the remedy of that former name.
144 See also Tolland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961), noted at 39 DICTA 99 (1962) (trial
court tried defendant too hastily and so "exceeded its jurisdiction").
145 Cf. Douglas v. Municipal Court, 377 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1963) (writ of prohibition to
prohibit prosecution in municipal court for violation of penal ordinance denied, in view of
adequate remedy of defending at jury trial, followed by review on writ of error).
146 The original rules proposed by the Colorado Bar Association Committee contained Rule
42 on procedure in criminal contempt cases, but the rule was deleted by the Colorado Supreme
Court in adopting the Rules in 1961.
147 Schooley v. Wilson, 374 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1962), applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-17-6 (1953),
as amended by Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 104.
148 Colo. Const. art. II, §18 " . . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. If the jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after the verdict, or if the
judgment be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in
jeopardy."
149 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d (Colo. 1962). See supra notes 10-12 and text for a discussion
of this erroneous ruling.
150 Menton v. Johns, 377 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1962).
151 E.g., Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). Confro: State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30
AtI. 1110 (1894). The Connecticut view does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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that, under Colorado's unusual provision, a retrial, after an erroneous acquittal not on the merits, does not constitute double
jeopardy. Colorado provides that "if the judgment be reversed for
error in law" the defendant is not deemed to have been in jeopardy;
and this literally is broad enough to include the reversal of an
erroneous acquittal (as well as the reversal of an erroneous conviction) on account of the trial court's error of law. As to whether
a retrial should be permitted on principle, I am impressed by this
recent statement concerning trial court errors: "In the criminal
area, it is hard to say whether more harm is done by unjust convictions or unjust acquittals. Perhaps the latter, for an appellate
and there is a fair to
court can weed out the unjust convictions,
52
good chance that it actually will do so."'
In another 1962 case, the defendant, convicted of larceny from
the person (a felony, with a maximum penalty of ten years in the
penitentiary) was erroneously sentenced by the trial court to six
months in the county jail (a misdemeanor sentence).'11 The prosecution appealed, and the supreme court naturally held the sentence to be erroneous. But the supreme court "disapproved" of
the sentence instead of remanding for a new sentence. Does double
jeopardy forbid a correct resentence here? Surely, it does not154
even if the net result may be the imposition of a more severe
sentence,'
of course, time served under 15the
old sentence should
6
be counted as service under the new one.
X. Postconviction Remedies
1. Habeas Corpus.-The habeas corpus remedy is available
only to persons in custody. Very likely one who has been convicted,
served part of his sentence and been paroled is in "constructive"
custody for habeas corpus purposes,
so long as he is under the super1 57
vision of the parole department.
In 1958, the Colorado Supreme Court disapproved of the trial
court's practice of appointing counsel for an indigent convict seeking habeas corpus relief, on the ground that habeas corpus is a
civil, not a criminal, remedy.15 8 In a recent federal case involving
a petition for federal habeas corpus brought by a Colorado convict
having difficulty, without the aid of counsel, in exhausting his
Colorado remedies, the federal district judge expressed his concern
over this Colorado policy, calling it a "sad commentary" on Colorado's judicial system. 15 1" It may be noted, however, that the new
remedy created by Colorado Rule 35 (b) provides for postconviction relief on behalf of convicted defendants under certain circum152 Bishop, Book Review, 72 Yale L. J. 618, 622 (1963).
1.53 People v. McIntosh, 369 P.2d 987 (Colo. 1962).
154 Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(a)
(1961)
authorizes a trial court to correct an illegal sentence
at any time. A misdemeanor sentence for a felony conviction is surely an "illegal"
sentence
within the meaning of the Rule, just as a felony sentence for a misdemeanor conviction would be.
155 Cf. United States v. Howell, 103 F.Supp. 714 (D.W.Va.
1952), aff'd 199 F.2d 366 (4th
Cir. 1952)
(a
sentence declared
void because
of absence
of defendant's
counsel when
sentence pronounced may be increased on resenten:e, the void sentence being nonexistent).
156Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c) (1961), as amended in 1963, see supra notes 49-50 and text thereto,
specifically so provides.
157 See Schooley v. Wilson, 374 P.2d 353, 354 (Colo. 1962) (the parolee having been jailed
for investigation of suspected parole violation held to be in actual custody and so eligible for
habeas corpus relief).
158 McGrath v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 18, 328 P.2d 579 (1958).
159 Pigg v. Tinsley, (D. Colo. 1963) (unreported). See Rocky Mt. News, Jan. 22, 1963.
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stances, 160 and this is a criminal, not a civil, remedy, for which
a trial court probably may, though it need not, appoint counsel.
2. Remedy under Rule 35(b).-The first case utilizing this new
remedy reached the supreme court in 1962.161 The defendant's postconviction motion to vacate his sentence for burglary stated, among
other things, that his guilty plea had been obtained by threats to
arrest and prosecute his sister unless he admitted participation in
the burglary. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing
as to the truth of the allegations of coercion. The wrong complained
of, the court said, was not the type of wrong remediable by Rule
35 (b), since the normal remedy of writ of error had been available
to correct the wrong if the defendant was thus coerced into pleading
guilty. The supreme court merely stated that the trial court "correctly" denied the motion.
While it is true that the writ of error is an adequate remedy to
right many constitutional wrongs, it is not adequate if the wrong
does not appear on the record so as to be reviewable on error.
And the fact that a guilty plea is coerced would naturally not
appear in the record.' 62- Rule 35 (b) expressly provides for relief
in the case of a violation of constitutional rights "of a sort not
effectively subject to review on writ of error . . . because the

violation through no fault of the prisoner did not appear upon the
record so as to be subject to review." Thus the trial court should
have held a hearing
as to the truth of the allegations of coercion
163
of the guilty plea.
Y. Extradition
Two 1962 cases concerned the extradition, from Colorado to another state, of a fugitive from the other state who had fled to Colorado. In each case the other state's governor had made demand upon
the Colorado governor for the extradition of the fugitive, who had
160See Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (1961).
This Rule contains nothing about the appointment of
counsel. Rule 44 provides for appointment of counsel to represent the indigent defendant in a
felony case "at every stoge of the trial court proceedings." Perhaps this does not cover the
postconviction phase in the trial court, but that does not mean the trial court may not appoint
counsel if it believes justice requires it. The federal courts often appoint counsel for indigent
federal or state prisoners seeking postconviction relief in the federal courts. E.g., Dillon v.
United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) (federal prisoner); United States ex rel. Wissonfeld
v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960) (state prisoner).
161 Hudspeth v. People, 375 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1962).
162 Thus in Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), postconviction habeas corpus was allowed for
the allegation that federal police coerced a guilty plea from a federal criminal defendant.
163 See Symposium on the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, 35 Rocky Mt. L.. Rev. 70-71
(1961)
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then been arrested on the Colorado governor's warrant and lodged
in a Colorado jail. In one case, the district court on its own motion
dismissed the extradition proceeding, because no agent from that
state had come to Colorado for the fugitive within sixty days after
his Colorado arrest. 1 64 The supreme court disapproved of this action
by the trial court, stating that the proper procedure is for the
fugitive to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to be followed
by a courtroom hearing after notice to the proper Colorado and
foreign officials. 1 65 In the other case, the fugitive filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus alleging certain defects in the extradition proceeding. 6 6 The court granted the petition, ordering the
sheriff (who had custody of the fugitive) to show cause why he
properly detained the fugitive. A hearing was held at which the
sheriff showed, by presenting the extradition papers, that the extradition proceeding was valid. The court thereupon discharged the
writ. On error, the fugitive argued that since the sheriff never
filed a formal written return to the writ before the hearing, the
hearing was defective. The supreme court rejected his contention,
properly placing substance ahead of form.
Z. Criminal Contempt
Two 1962 cases dealt with criminal contempt. In one the
district attorney was not present, either personally or by his official
representative, when a criminal case on the docket was called for
trial. 167 This absence caused considerable inconvenience and delay
in the transaction of the court's business. When the district attorney next appeared in court, the court summarily held him in contempt, imposing a $25 fine. On review by the supreme court, the
judgment of contempt was vacated. It may well be criminal contempt for a district attorney "wilfully or intentionally 1 68 to be
absent when a case is called, thus causing inconvenience and delay;
but if so, it is not a direct contempt committed entirely in the
court's presence. The mental element (wilfulness or intention)
cannot be known by the court through personal observation in
the courtroom-unlike the case of the disappointed litigant or his
lawyer who throws a brickbat at, or who makes known his displeasure by using abusive language toward, the judge as he sits
on the bench. Indirect contempts are not punishable summarily.
Although, in the case of indirect contempt, there need not be an
information followed by trial by jury, there must at least be notice
to the alleged contemnor (if he is not in court, notice is generally
in the form of a rule to show cause why he should not be adjudged
in contempt for the alleged specific misconduct), followed by a
hearing at which he is entitled to defend himself, before the court
can adjudge him in contempt.
164 Krutko v. Bryer, 372 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1962).
165 Query, however, whether the delay of sixty days in coming for the accused by representatives of the demanding state is a proper ground for dismissing the proceeding on a writ of habeas
corpus, since the statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 60.1-10 (1953), provides that a petition for habeas
corpus by the fugitive is the proper way to "test the legality of his arrest." Delay after arrest
con hardly affect the legality of the arrest itself.
166 Bright v. Foster, 374 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1962).
167 District Attorney v. District Court, 371 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1962).
168 Query what "wilfully" means.
Perhaps it means "recklessly" - i.e.,the district attorney
realizes that there is a great risk of delay and inconvenience though he does not know for sure
that this will happen and does not desire it.
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In the other case, the supreme court said that a lawyer who, in
violation of the trial court's rules, showed up for the pretrial conference in a civil case totally unprepared might perhaps be guilty
of a direct criminal contempt p u n i s h a b 1 e summarily. 16t The
supreme court held, however, that the following irregular procedure by the trial court in handling the matter was improper.
The trial court, three days after the attending lawyer's misconduct,
entered an order retroactive to the day of the misconduct ordering
that the lawyer pay $150 "expenses" to the lawyer for the other
side, who had been inconvenienced by the offending lawyer's
unpreparedness. The trial court did not, in fact, think to call the
matter a contempt for another month,
when for the first time it
spoke of it as a disciplinary matter. 170
AA. Juvenile Delinquency
A juvenile delinquency proceeding is defective, and a determination of delinquency must be reversed, if the statutory requirement of notice to the juvenile's parents or guardian, giving the
date and hour of the hearing, is not fulfilled. 17 1
BB. Statutory Changes
The 1962 legislature made two minor amendments to existing
Colorado criminal procedure.
1. Statute of Limitations.-Existing Colorado law exempts,
from the ordinary three-year statute of limitations 172 on prosecutions for felonies, the crimes of murder, forgery and kidnapping,
for which trio of crimes there is no time limitation at all. In 1962
another exception was provided for: in the case of felonies (other
than the select three) committed by a public official in connection
with the duties of his office, the official must be prosecuted within
three years after the termination of his employment, or within six
17
years after the commission of his crime, whichever first occurs. 3
2. Insanity Procedure.-ExistingColorado law allows the trial
court to order the mental examination of a defendant who has
pleaded insanity at the time of the alleged crime (or who claims
later to have become insane), to be conducted by a commission
of one to three psychiatrists. The law before 1962 required that
these psychiatrists live or have an office within thirty miles of
the town where the case is pending; but a 1962 amendment eliminates the thirty-mile requirement, 174 no doubt because in some areas
of Colorado there are simply no psychiatrists to be found within a
thirty-mile radius of the place of trial.
169 Pittman v. District Court, 369 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1962).
170 It is unfortunate that the Colorado Supreme Court, in adopting the Colorado Rules, did
not adopt proposed Rule 42 on criminal contempt based upon Fed. R. Crim. P. 42, which makes
quite plain the difference between direct and indirect criminal contempts and the different procedure
to be followed depending upon the type of contempt involved.
171 Martinez v. People, 372 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1962), based upon Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 22-8-1, 22-8-3
(Supp. 1960) (parents or guardian must be notified of the hearing and must show whether they
are able to correct the child or remove the cause of his delinquency).
172 That is, the indictment must be found, or the information filed, within three years after
the felony is committed.
173 Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 44, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-1-3 (1953).
Why forgery
belongs in the select group of three felonies as to which there is no time limitation is something
of a mystery. For an argument favoring the amendment of the statute of limitations concerning
embezzlement, see 36 DICTA 42 (1959).
174 Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 45 amending §§ 39-8-2(1), 39-8-6, as amended in 1961.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By

HOMER

H.

CLARK, JR.*

The 1962 judicial decisions on domestic relations in Colorado
announced no radical departures from prior law. Similarly, the 1962
session of the general assembly produced no legislation of note in
the field of domestic relations. A few of the court cases dealt with
interesting or unusual factual situations which have been noted in
this one year review.
DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS

Two cases concern the merits of divorce actions. The first,
Heckel v. Heckel,1 merely affirmed the trial court's findings on disputed issues of fact as they related to cruelty. The second case,
Harvey v. Harvey,2 likewise affirmed the finding of cruelty, leaving
to the trial court the question whether there were mitigating circumstances. The case also held that the wife was not barred by res
judicata when she brought a second action for divorce, having lost
her first action, so long as she relied in the second action on acts
of cruelty which had occurred after the first action was dismissed.
This application
of res judicata to divorce actions is well estab3
lished.
In Simpson v. Simpson,4 the supreme court laid down some useful principles for the application of preliminary restraining orders
in divorce actions. The trial court had restrained certain third party
defendants from turning over property or funds to the husband and,
in addition, had ordered one of the third party defendants to pay
into the registry of the court the amount of $25,000, apparently as
a kind of security against alimony which might be awarded in the
future. The supreme court reversed this action, stating that although
under Rules 111 and 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure restraining
orders may be entered in divorce actions without notice to the defendant and without the requirement of a bond, this should be done
only under extraordinary circumstances or where an actual emergency exists. The court went on to find that no such extraordinary
circumstances or emergency had been shown in this case and that,
therefore, the restraining order was improperly entered. In addition, the court expressly disapproved the practice of bringing in
banks and business associates of the husband as parties to divorce
actions.
Two cases this year concern the award of attorney's fees in
divorce actions. The first of these, Morrison v. Peck,5 held that an
attorney for the wife may file a motion in the divorce action for
the award of attorney's fees against either the wife or the husband,
relying on the general language of the alimony statute. This seems
to be a rather doubtful procedure 6 since the attorney for the wife is
not a party to the divorce action and normally courts do not enter
Professor
1 373 P.2d
2 373 P.2d
3 Geers v.
4 376 P.2d
5 376 P.2d
6 Cf. Weil

of Low, University of Colorado School of Low.
303 (Colo. 1962).
304 (Colo. 1962).
Geers, 95 N.H. 316, 63 A.2d 244 (1949).
55 (Colo. 1962).
58 (Colo. 1962).
v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 2d 373, 217 P.2d 975 (1950).
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judgments in law suits in favor of persons who are not parties. It
puts the attorney in a very peculiar position with respect to a conflict of interests. In the divorce action he represents the wife at the
very time he is asserting a claim against her for his fee. In the
Morrison case itself there was no conflict of interest because the
particular attorney seeking a fee had withdrawn from the case at
an earlier stage. Furthermore, the purpose of the statutory authorization of an award of attorney's fees is not for the protection of the
attorney but rather to insure that the wife is provided with legal
services as well as with other necessaries of life. The other case on
attorneys' fees in divorce actions held that they are not debts dischargeable in bankruptcy. 7 This is in line with the decisions in other
states.8
Several cases this year dealt with the question of modification
9
of alimony and child support payments. Pritchardv. Pritchard
held
that when the wife moved that the husband be held in contempt
for non-payment of child support, the trial court, without formal
action by the husband and over the wife's objection, committed
reversible error in reducing the amount due. The supreme court said
such action requires a motion by the husband and proof by him
that the relevant circumstances have changed. Haase v. Haase1"
held that where there are successive petitions for modification of
alimony, the later petition must be based on changes in circumstance which have occurred after the denial of the first petition.
This is of course correct since the other rule would allow a repeated relitigation of matters already determined by the earlier
petition for modification.
The question of modification of a divorce decree so as to include
an alimony award after the decree had been entered and had become final was dealt with again in Burson v. Burson.1 In this case
the wife sued for divorce and custody of the children, her complaint
containing no prayer for alimony. Nine months after the divorce
decree had been entered she filed a motion in the action asking for
alimony. The court dismissed the motion, giving two reasons for
this disposition. The first reason was that the statute governing the
award of alimony contains "no machinery for putting in motion that
which the statute purports to empower the trial court to do .... -12
It is not at all clear what is meant by this language. The statute
seems to be as clear as a statute can be since it provides that "At
all times after the filing of a complaint, whether before or after the
issuance of a divorce decree, the court may make such orders, if
any, as the circumstances of the case may warrant for: . . . alimony. ' 13 The obvious purpose of this statute is to make it possible
for alimony to be included in divorce decrees at any time, whether
before or after the decree is entered, without any reservation of jurisdiction. The supreme court may disapprove of the policy of such a
statute but this would not seem to justify reading it out of the statute books. The second reason for refusal of alimony in the Burson
7 Allison v. Allison, 372 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1962).
8 E.g., In re Brennen, 39 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.N.Y.
9 367 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1962).
10 376 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1962).
11 369 P.2d 979 (Colo. 1962).
12 Id. at 980.
13 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5(1)(d) (Supp. 1960).
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case was that the wife had not asked for alimony in her complaint
and under Rule 54(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure a default
judgment cannot be entered different in kind or amount from that
demanded in the complaint. This rule is properly applied to divorce
actions, since a husband may be willing to have the suit go against
him by default where he sees no claim for alimony in the complaint,
whereas he might wish to defend on the merits if alimony were
claimed. This reason does not apply in the Burson case, however,
since it would have been quite easy to give the husband notice of
the claim for alimony when the motion was made and allow him at
that time to come in and present whatever defenses to the alimony
claim he might have available. In that way the objection based on
Rule 54(c) could be overcome.
Two cases during 1962 concerned the extent and modification
of payments due under separation agreements. In re Kettering's
Estate 14 held that the payments did not survive the death of the
husband even though the agreement, which was incorporated in the
divorce decree, provided that the payments would continue "so long
as the wife may live and remain unmarried."'" The court construed
the agreement as a whole and found that other provisions including
one by which the husband agreed to leave the sum of $10,000 by
will either to a trust set up to guarantee the payments, or directly
to the wife, indicated that this was to be the exclusive provision for
the wife after the husbands death and negated the inference created
by other parts of the agreement that the payments would continue
beyond his death. This would seem to be a satisfactory reading of
the agreement, although arguments could be made the other way
and were made by the dissenting opinion in this case. The case
should serve as a warning to the attorneys drafting such agreements
to provide specifically in the agreement either for continuance or
for termination of the payments upon the husband's death.
The second case referred to is Irwin v. Irwin.'6 In this case the
divorce was granted to the husband, the decree including provisions
for a division of certain real and personal property and an order for
alimony and child support. A little more than a year after the decree the parties entered into an agreement changing the disposition
of the property and increasing the payments of alimony. By this
14 376 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1962).
15 Id. at 985.
16 372 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1962).
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agreement the payments of child support were continued in accordance with the earlier decree. The agreement was approved by a
judge of the district court. About two years after the agreement
the husband filed a motion to terminate alimony, to reduce the
amount of the support money payable to the children and also to
reduce certain payments on the real estate of the parties and on
insurance policies. The husband alleged at this time a change in the
circumstances of the parties. After a hearing the trial court relieved
the husband of support payments for one of the children, changed
the provision with respect to alimony and gave to the husband certain policies of insurance which under the agreement were to be
maintained for the benefit of the wife and children. On appeal the
supreme court held that the trial court had erred in entering such
an order, apparently on the ground that the rights of the parties
had been established by the 1959 contract and that the constitutional
prohibition upon impairment of the obligations of contracts prevented any subsequent modifiation. No cases or other authorities
are cited in the opinion and it is therefore difficult to be certain
just what the basis for this result was. A proper analysis of this
case would turn on whether the agreement of the parties became
a part of the divorce decree. If it did, then it would seem modifiable
upon a showing of changed circumstances just as any other divorce
decree is, whether based on agreement originally or not. The authorities in Colorado make this principle clear enough at least with
respect to alimony and child support. 17 Those parts of the decree
or the agreement which relate to property are normally not modifiable.' 8 The opinion of the supreme court indicates that the agreement of the parties was approved by the court and under the statute now in force this may be sufficient to make it part of the decree, since the statute says that a written agreement or stipulation
of the parties "when incorporated in an order or decree or when
filed in the action and referred to and approved and adopted in any
order or decree, shall become a part of such order or decree." 19 If
the agreement was not part of the decree because not incorporated
or adopted in accordance with the statute, the authorities in other
jurisdictions say that this does not prevent the court from modifying
the original decree with respect to its alimony and child support
provisions. 20 Such agreements, when made after the entry of alimony and property decrees, are usually held not binding on the
parties or the court unless they are presented to the court and made
a part of the existing decree.
The division of property in divorce actions must be made either
at the time the divorce decree is entered or, if afterwards, only
upon reservation of jurisdiction in the divorce decree. This rule,
found in the statutes ,21 is reiterated this year by Triebelhorn v. Tur2 2
zanski..
In two other cases the familiar principle that the property
17 E.g. Harris v. Harris, 113 Colo. 41, 154 P.2d 617 (1944); Hall v. Hall, 105 Colo. 227, 97 P.2d
415 (1939).
18 McDonald v. McDonald, 374 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1962); Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117 Colo. 296, 186 P.2d
583 (1947).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5(6) (Supp. 1960).
20 Hoops v. Hoops, 292 N.Y. 428, 55 N.E.2d 488 (1944). Other cases are collected in Annot., 166
A.L.R. 370 (1947), and in Desvernine, Ground for Modification of Alimony Awards, 6 Low & Contemp. Prob. 236, 247 (1939).
21 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5(2) (Supp. 19601.
22 370 P.2d 757 (Colo. 1962).
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division is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court,
not to be reversed except upon proof of abuse of this discretion, was
restated.2 3 A third case, Bell v. Bell,'2 4 although adhering to this rule,
found that there was an abuse of discretion in an order which required the husband to pay off large incumbrances on certain property and deliver the property to the wife, without any findings as
to the value of the property of the parties and without other findings which would support such a requirement. Finally, the case of
McDonald v. McDonald2 5 held that property divisions in divorce
decrees are final and not open to modification, a6 familiar principle
adhered to in jurisdictions other than Colorado .2
A waiver of widow's allowance in an ante-nuptial agreement
was upheld as effective in Maher v. Knaussf2 illustrating the type
of specific language in the agreement which is essential to get this
result.
PARENT AND CHILD

Four cases in 1962 concerned problems of custody of children
arising out of divorce actions. Only one of these cases involved an
original grant of custody and this case merely held that since the
trial court had failed to make findings on the character and fitness
of the parties as custodians the award of custody of a small child
to the husband would be reversed. 28 The second case, Grosso v.
Grosso,29 modified an existing custody decree in such a way as to
cancel the visitation rights of the husband on the ground that the
parties had been using the child to hurt each other and that this
was jeopardizing the child's welfare. The third case, Holland v. Holland,30 upheld the trial court's finding that the child's best interests
did not justify authorizing the mother to take the child to Spain.
This decision was in part apparently based on the ground that the
mother had taken the child to Spain after the trial court's decision
was rendered but before the appeal was decided. The supreme court
said that although a change of custody should not be granted as a
means of punishing one of the parties for violating the custody
order, disregard of an order is a factor which the court may weigh
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Harvey v. Harvey, 373 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1962); Cohan v. Cohan, 372 P.2d 149 (Colo. 1962).
371 P.2d 773 (Colo. 1962).
374 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1962).
Many cases are collected in Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 270, 302 (1956).
370 P.2d 1017 (Colo. 1962).
Songster v. Songster, 374 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1962).
368 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1962).
373 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1962).
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in awarding custody. The trial court's decision that custody should
shift to the husband under these circumstances was therefore approved.
The most interesting of the custody cases is Root v. Allen."
In this case the parents of the child had been divorced and had both
remarried. Sometime after her second marriage the child's mother,
who had custody of the child, died. The father then filed a petition
for habeas corpus seeking to obtain custody of the child from the
stepfather. After a thorough consideration of the requirements of
the child's welfare and best interests the supreme court refused
habeas corpus, holding that the child should remain in the custody
of the stepfather. A major factor in this decision was the long period
during which the child had been in the household of the stepfather
and the warm and stable relationships she had formed there. The
case is particularly interesting in illustrating that the claims of a
natural parent will not always be superior to those of one not related to the child by blood.
An interesting case on adoption, Batton v. Massar,32 calls attention to a conflict between the adoption and the relinquishment statutes. In this case the mother of the child consented to its adoption
by its paternal grandparents. No relinquishment proceeding was
had. Shortly after the adoption decree became final the child's
mother filed a motion to vacate the decree on the ground that it
was entered without jurisdiction, not being in exact compliance
with that section of the statutes requiring a relinquishment proceeding when the natural parent of the child to be adopted is a
minor, 33 as was the case here. The supreme court held that the
adoption decree should not be vacated, stating that the only part of
the statute to be given meaning is that part which reads "The minority of a natural parent shall not be a bar to such parents' consent
to adoption .... "3 The further language of that section, which reads,
"provided, a court of competent jurisdiction has decreed the relinquishment of said child and affirmed subsequent adoption, ' 35 was
held by the supreme court to be meaningless and surplus. The writer has commented at length on this case in another place, there
arguing that a prior relinquishment proceeding is required by the
31
32
33
34
35

377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962).
369 P.2d 434 (Colo. 1962).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-6(3) (1953).
Ibid.
Ibid.
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statutes where the consent to adoption is that of a person under the
age of twenty-one. 6
The familiar rule that a child born to a married woman in wedlock is presumed legitimate was re-emphasized in Lanford v. Lanford.37 The court in that case stated that this is one of the strongest
presumptions known to the law and that it may be overcome only
by proof of impotence or non-access by the husband at the time
when the child could have been conceived. The court went on to
say that the normal period of gestation is from 266 to 270 days, but
that the cases had recognized that much shorter periods are possible.
The trial court's charge to the jury was held erroneous in this case
on the ground that the jury should have been required to determine
whether the husband had access to his wife at any time during the
period of possible conception of his child. The court also held that
it was error to require the wife to testify on cross-examination as
to intercourse with a man other than her husband in the absence
of evidence by the husband overcoming the presumption of legitimacy.
Two further cases dealt with relatively minor points in juvenile
court proceedings. Martinez v. People"' held that a citation issued
to parents of a child charged with juvenile delinquency was invalid
under the applicable statute 39 when it contained no notice of the
date and time of hearing and no endorsement of service on the return. In addition this case held that a decree in a delinquency proceeding ordering the imprisonment of a juvenile in the county jail
is not authorized by the delinquency statute.4 0 In the other case,
Robles v. People,41 it was held that a motion to vacate the decree
finding the defendant the father of a child and ordering him to
support the child was not a final judgment and therefore could not
be reviewed by the supreme court on a writ of error.
36 Clark, Batton v. Massor: The Finality of Colorado Adoptions, 35 Colo. Rev. No. 3 (1963).
37 377 P.2d 115 (Colo. 1962).
3S 372 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1962).
39 Colo. Rev. Stat.
22-8-3 (Supp. 1960).
40 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-11 (Supp. 1960).
41 373 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1962).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By

WILLIAM P. CANTWELL*

Activity in the probate and trust field in 1962 was high. Many
of the cases, however, involved well documented areas in specific
situations and thus significant new developments in the law were
few.
Maher v. Knauss' concerned an antenuptial agreement under
which a "widow's allowance" had been waived. The allowance having been claimed, the supreme court was faced with the question
of the breadth of the terms used in the agreement. It had little
difficulty in determining that the Colorado statutory allowance was
within the coverage of the premarital waiver, and consequently
deemed the allowance to have been fully barred by the agreement.
The always difficult stock-split problem was faced again in
Heinneman v. Colorado College.2 Under a bequest of 108 shares of
American Telephone and Telegraph Co., which was followed in
time by a three for one split of the stock, the court determined that
the testamentary intent was to deliver to the beneficiaries the same
proportionate interest in the company that 108 shares were at the
time of the will. As a result, 324 shares were actually carried by the
will's bequest of 108 shares.
Abatement, another classic problem, received attention in 1962
in Breymaier v. Davidson3 as a result of an election against the will.
A "family agreement" was viewed by the supreme court as creating
a legacy by agreement in favor of a daughter who would otherwise
have received only a share of the residue. Since abatement of legacies was required, the daughter who had created a "post-mortem
legacy" found that it abated ratably with the testamentary provisions.
The ferment relating to powers of appointment continued during the year. In a bizarre and unusual fact setting, taxpayer and
tax collector again found sparring material. People v. Cooke 4 involved the inheritance taxation of assets subject to an unexercised
special power of appointment over intangibles physically located
in New York. The trust under which the power was held was
created when Colorado had no inheritance tax, and when the decedent and the settlor had no domiciliary or other contacts with Colorado. The decedent had lived in Colorado for less than a year before
she died; the Inheritance Tax Commissioner asserted a tax under
the power of appointment statute. The Denver County Court held
that Colorado had insufficient contacts to assert a tax under the
federal and state due process clauses. In a harsh decision for the
taxpayer, the supreme court reversed, holding that the broad sweep
of the power of appointment provision reached the assets even
though the law was enacted after the interest was created.
Mr. Cantwell is a member
firm of Holland and Hart.
1 370 P.2d 1017 (Colo. 1962).
2 374 P.2d 695 (Colo. 1962).
3 368 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1962).
4 370 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1962).
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No year seems complete without a fee dispute and on this premise, 1962 was complete. Mellman v. Alger5 was a case in which
Attorney I had received a fee in an estate under an order from
which no appeal was taken. Attorney II claimed fees for preliminary services and the county court ordered that part of the fee paid
to Attorney I should be paid over to Attorney II. The supreme court
held that the county court had no jurisdiction to change its original
order which had become final.
A series of cases dealt with classic problems in the field. Denton
v. Kumpf 6 involved a legacy to George and a claim by George Jr.
5 372

P.2d 435 (Colo. 1962).
6 373 P.2d 306 (Colo. 1962).
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that he was George after George had predeceased the testator. The
ingenious argument failed and the gift lapsed. Since it was a gift
of an interest in residue with no apparent cross-gift provisions, it
lapsed not into residue, but into intestacy-a type of drafting error
that can be said to express the "intent" of very few testators! Another lapse problem developed in State Board v. Hays,7 wherein a
gift was made to the Colorado State Soldier and Sailors Home, a
legatee nonexistent at testator's death. Even though the county
court had determined that a lapse had occurred, the supreme court
refused to hear argument on the point, since testamentary capacity,
and implicitly, the decedent's intent, had been raised but not determined below. Because lapse was necessarily a question of intent,
capacity needed to be determined first. Unusual interweaving of
different quality and quantity of ownership rights was the problem
in Bear v. Bear.8 There was homesteaded federal property; partnership; joint tenancy; reserved coal rights; a coal lease; an easement;
a divorce; and ultimately the rights to partnership property upon
dissolution. If a short summary of the case is possible, it is fair to
say that when such diverse forms of property rights are involved,
each will be recognized to the extent feasible!
More of the problem of personal injury claims against estates
were involved in Gushurst v. Benham9 in which the only estate
asset was a public liability policy. The claimant sued the estate and
insurance company defended. After a verdict for the claimant, the
administrator appealed, but the claimant contended that the insurance company was the only party aggrieved and the only one entitled to appeal. The court held that the administrator was the real
party aggrieved and that the insurance company was not the proper
party to appeal. Mental incapacity was an issue in In Re Sebben's
Estate10 in which a district court's failure to submit the question to
the jury was held to be error.
More restitution problems were the principal trust law developments. Taylor v. Taylor" involved a resulting trust based upon consideration furnished by the plaintiff, while Colorado So. Pet. Corp.
v. Stone12 raised an issue of alleged deceitful transfers by a corporate president, which, however, were not proved to be violative
of the officer's fiduciary duty in any event. Alleged breach of a3
fiduciary relationship was also before the court in White v. White.1
Here it was urged that the parent-child relationship was a fiduciary
one, and required a showing of proper delivery of a deed from
parent to child notwithstanding recording of the deed. The court
found no such relationship, no undue influence, and no showing of
a failure to deliver the deed. An accounting between co-tenants was
the issue in Dallabettav. Estate of Rajacich 4 and in such a proceeding, the supreme court said no issue as to failure of a deceased cotenant to compensate the other co-tenant for the use of the cotenancy property could be determined.
7 369
8 377
9 376
10 375
11 372
12 369
13 368
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